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four year contract. A model of utility maximization was
used to determine the quit decision. Probit analyses were
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Empirical results of the model indicated, for personal
factors, being married and from a minority group signifi-
cantly reduced guits. The results on census region were
generally inconclusive but those from the Pacific and New
England area had a higher propensity to quit. The human
capital factors supported evidence from previous literature
that high school graduates are the "best bet" and less like-
ly to guit. Finally, the job-specific factors for MOS indi-
cate that the two areas with the greatest likelihood of
quits were infantrymen and electronic equipment repairman;
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Because our military system increasingly requires
skilled and experienced personnel, the retention of those
who have such skills and experience has become a major pol-
icy goal. Enlisted personnel who enter the Marine Corps are
committed to active duty tours ranging from three to six
years. This analysis will focus on those Marines who en-
listed in fiscal year 1981, on a four year contract. There
are primarily two types of separation that occur, (1)
those who decide to quit prior to their initial contract and
(2) those who decide to quit at the end of their enlistment.
Each of these separations has major policy implications
since substantial costs are incurred in recruiting, process-
ing, and training personnel throughout a four-year
enlistment. Additionally, there is another and greater cost
that can be incurred which is difficult to measure; that is
the negative effect that attrition has on overall readiness.
Early attrition from the Marine Corps (leaving before ful-
filling contract) is primarily a function of substandard be-
havior of individuals. Since current policies require the
discharge of those with substandard behavior, one cannot
determine if these individuals wanted to stay in or quit the
military. My focus for this study will be on a choice-base
model. It is therefore necessary to analyze only those who
made the quit decision at the end of their first term of
service
.
The current trend of increased quits and the inevita-
bility of tryinq to recruit from a shrinking "qualified mil-
itary available" (QMA) base are a real potential problem for
manpower planners. Today's Marine Corps is an orqanization
that is becominq increasinqly technical which in turn re-
quires increasinqly skilled and experienced personnel. If
the Marine Corps is qoinq to maintain its ability to manaqe
the skill and experience structure of the Corps into the
mid-1990' s, it will need to know more about the reasons why
people quit.
B. Research Questions
This analysis examines the questions of what demo-
qraphic, human capital, and job-related factors influence a
Marine's decision to leave the Corps at the end of his first
term of enlistment. Demoqraphic factors include character-
istics such as aqe, race, sex, marital status, and number of
dependents. Human capital factors reflect the amount of
time an individual spends in qatherinq education and train-
inq that could have been spent at work. These factors in-
clude education, participation in service-oriented youth
proqrms, such as the Junior Reserve Officer Traininq Corps
(JROTC) and Sea Cadets, and previous work experience. The
job-related factors include pay, promotions, military occu-
pational specialty (MOS), and expectations of future salary
as related to bonus incentive programs, special pays, and
opportunity for promotion.
Two major problems are encountered in attempting to do
research in this area. First, due to the wide variety of
MOS's, it becomes necessary to group individuals into gene-
ralized occupatinal categories. In doing so, it is possible
for offsetting factors within the groups to mask the effect
a specific MOS may have on the decision to leave, by absorb-
ing part of the variance between itself and the dependent
variable. Second, to identify those factors that influence
the decision to leave, the statistical models generally re-
guire that other factors are held constant while evaluating
each factor separately. Models that allow for interactions
among the independent variables are complex, and beyond the
scope of this research. Additionally, this method accounts
for differences in individual attitudes and specific
"tastes" for life in the Marine Corps in a limited way. It
assumes that these attitudes and tastes are distributed
randomly in the sample, and are independent of the explana-
tory variables.
C. Scope of Thesis
This study focuses on actual decisions to leave the
Marine Corps as measured by personnel records. In analytic
terras, I am interested in those factors that contribute to
an individual's decision to leave the Marines. The leave
decision can best be understood in the context of labor mar-
ket competition for skills, in which the Marine Corps com-
petes against other services and the civilian sector for
necessary personnel. Within this framework, individuals
assess the value of compensation and other benefits provided
by the Marine Corps, weigh them against civilian
opportunities, and act in a manner to maximize their self-
benefit. The Marine Corps, on the other hand, has limited
resources to induce individuals to remain, and as such acts
to minimize its costs in retaining personnel. It is those
factors that are subject to policy control by the Marine
Corps, Department of the Navy (DoN), and the Department of
Defense (DoD), such as military compensation, eligibility
requirements, benefits, etc., that I will concentrate upon.
It is important to know, for example, whether most of the
variance in the decision to leave is associated with
compensation, a factor that DoD can directly affect, or
whether the leave decision is a result of specific features
of the service environment or attitudes individuals hold
about the Marine Corps.
There will be two types of analysis done: (1) an aggre-
gate probit model using the 1981 cohort data, and (2)
selected subsamples based- on demographic characteristics of
specific groups. These models will then be tested using the
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1982 cohort to determine their ability to correctly predict
leavers. The results from each model will be compared to
determine if a statistical difference exists between them.
The use of OLS , logistic, and Probit functional form will be
further discussed in the Methodology Section.
Previous research in this area has focused on those
individuals who decided to stay in the military and the fac-
tors that influenced them. This approach has its limita-
tions in that estimates produced could be omitted variables,
and the limited sample can cause selection bias effects.
For example, suppose that I estimate the effect of education
level by comparing the guit rates of higher ranked and lower
ranked personnel. Even if all other factors are held
constant, people who are a higher rank may be different from
others. It could be that the guick advancement was a result
of a more productive and positive attitude toward the Marine
Corps to begin with. Selection bias in this model is impos-
sible to do away with. I attempt to control for this effect




The study is organized in the following chapters:
1. Literature Review -Will review and critigue previous
studies, both civilian and military, in the area of
guit behavior. This chapter is organized into
11
relevant civilian studies by theory and methodology
followed by military studies in early attrition and
the reenlistment decision.
2. Methodology and Data - I will first describe the
data, and discuss the use of Ordinary Least Sguares
Logit and Probit analysis as modeling techgniues.
Second, I will discuss the limitations and differ-
ences in the models. Also, I will utilize Pearson
Correlation test for multicollinearity and Chi-
sguare test to determine which variables are inde-
pendently associated with the dependent variable,
leave/stay.
3. Analysis and Results - Presentation of the original
Probit and selected demographic subsample parameter
estimates. Interpretation of results in terms of
the relationship between individual characteristics
and the dependent variable. Discuss anticipated
results of models as related to previous research.
4. Conclusions - A summary of the findings, discussion
of the strengths and weaknesses of the study and
recommendations for future studies.
12
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Research has shown that quitting behavior can be ana-
lyzed through the use of economic theories of utility,
specific human capital, job-matching, and job satisfaction.
This study focuses on the development of a choice-based eco-
nometric model derived through the application of these
factors
.
In my review of quit behavior literature I found a con-
sistent application of the economic theories of utility
maximization, human capital, job matching, and job
satisfaction. The basic approach to analysis of this
behavior has been to first establish a hypothesis about the
quitting behavior of a specific group. Second, is the
application of economic theories previously mentioned to
generally support the hypothesis. Third, is an explanation
of the data and the appropriate sanitation of its inputs.
Fourth, is the choosing of specific variables and model
building using econometric techniques. Finally, establish a
final model, evaluate the empirical results and talk further
on specific variables of interest (i.e., their elasticities,
significance, and positive or negative effects) and the
ability of the model to correctly predict quitting behavior.
First, I will discuss each of the theories as applied to
quit behavior. Then I will follow through the above process
of analysis of quit behavior by using selected articles.
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A. DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC THEORIES
To understand the effects of human capital, job
matching, and job satisfaction theories on quit behavior it
is essential to first understand the concept of utility,
which is an all encompassing umbrella. In traditional
micro-economic theory a "utility is a number that represents
the level of satisfaction that a consumer derives from a
particular market basket [Ref. 1]". An abstract application
of this definition applied to quit behavior would be that a
utility is a number that represent satisfaction with a
specific job's pay, fringe benefits, social status, and non-
pecuniary benefits. To utilize this theory the economist
makes three basic assumptions:
1. That an individual has a preference between different
jobs and leisure, who can decide and rank in order of
importance other alternatives.
2. That the preferences are transitive.
3. That an individual would always act to maximize his
utility.
Given these assumptions and that an individual acts in a
rational way to maximize his utility, one could then model
the quit decision. In modeling this behavior it is reason-
able to believe that a person would always want more and
more pay, status, or some other characteristics of job
satisfaction. However, the law of diminishing marginal
utility states, "as a person consumes more and more of a
given commodity, ceteris paribus, the marginal utility of
14
the commodity will eventually decline [Ref. 1]." This
implies, that at some point, it will take much more of a
commodity (for example, pay) to compensate an individual for
an additional hour of leisure. This helps explain why an
individual earning $500 per 50 hour week, would quit for a
job earning $360 per 40 hour week. In essence this indi-
vidual values his leisure time more than the $1.00 per hour
more he could make by working an additional 10 hours per
week. This is a simplistic two-dimensional example.
However, in real life these tradeoffs are multi-dimensional
with many different interacting variables. In the liter-
ature reviewed, these variables fall into the following
categories: personal characteristics, human captial
factors, job specific factors (both matching and satis-
faction), and perceptual. The economist then utilizes the
specific variables, which proxy for components of utility,
to develop a model of the quit decision.
Human capital theory can be thought of a as self-
investment, where an individual trades investments he has
made in himself (education, training, labor, talent) to a
particular firm which has a specific value for that labor.
The firm, in turn, pays interest on that labor in the form
of wages, further training or education, and certain fringe
and non-pecuniary benefits. What this implies is that indi-
viduals with certain skills may be of more value to one firm
than another and receive different returns on their
15
self-investment. Assuming that an individual has already
joined a firm, how does he know when to quit? Whenever the
increased returns both pay the initial costs of quitting and
yield a rate of return at least as high as alternative
investments of one's time he quits. It is important to note
that the costs of acquiring human capital occur immediately,
so in calculating the costs and benefits (which are received
in the future) one must use present value techniques.
Job matching theory looks at quit behavior in terms of
job separation based on imperfect information between indi-
vidual and the firm [Ref. 2, p. 973]. Before developing a
model using a job matching approach to turnover there are
three assumptions made:
1. A problem exists of optimally assigning workers to
job
.
2. Employers can contract with workers on an individual
basis
.
3. That imperfect information exists on both sides of the
market (employee vs. employer) about the exact loca-
tion of ones optimal assignment [Ref. 2, p. 974].
There are two categories into which job matching models
fall. First is the learning or experience model. In this
model an individual can not fully comprehend the character-
istics of the job without "experiencing it." Second is a
search model of job separations. In this model the specific
job characteristics are known; however, since it is costly
to search through alternatives, an individual may take a job
without complete information on other job prospects. While
16
working, and as more information becomes available about
other opportunities, an individual reappraises his current
contract and makes a separation decision.
Within the framework of job matching, previously
mentioned, is the question of how job satisfaction affects
quiting behavior. These characteristics are captured
usually in job specific and non-pecuniary variables. The
theory is that dissatisfied workers are more likely to quit
than satisfied workers, all other things being equal. These
variables deal with compensation, and also use "dummies" to
control for specific work type, i.e., laborer, engineer,
administrator, etc. Additionally, variables that effect the
non-pecuniary aspects of job satisfaction such as status and
perceived equality of treatment are included.
B. CIVILIAN STUDIES FIRM SPECIFIC
A study by Scholl [Ref. 3] selected two large Southern
California-based savings and loan associations to evaluate
the effect of "career line variables" on turnover and the
individuals intent on staying in the firm. The career line
can be seen as the number of positions from entry point to
ceiling in an organization [Ref. 3, p. 87]. As measures of
the individual's intent to remain in the organization,
Scholl uses turnover rate, ceiling (highest job attainable
in current career path), transit time (time between promo-
tions), position ratio, and mobility opportunity. These
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variables were then used to calculate an "intent to remain"
score. This score was then measured against an "intent to
remain scale." Finally, he measures a person's job position
and intent to remain, and the total score would reflect the
individual's current plans with respect to his future within
the organization. The future intent for the individual was
derived from a questionnaire given to the employees which
identified different degrees of intent to remain from short
to long term.
The results of this study support the hypothesis, that
career line variables are relevant to the individual's
membership decision. A weakness of the study is that it
fails to account for other variables affecting organiza-
tional commitment. In a sense, the study attempts to do a
one-dimensional model correlating turnover with career
status. Of the career based variables, a position's
mobility had the strongest association with membership. In
using this approach he has pre-selected variables affecting
"career line" out of his model, such as pay and status.
Therefore, this model suffers from variable exclusion, which
leads me to believe it is biased.
Parsons [Ref. 4] hypothesized that quit rates and layoff
rates are negatively related to the firms' and workers'
investments in human capital. Through the application of
firm specific human capital theory, Parsons analyzes the
quit rates and layoff rates of a broad section of
18
manufacturing industries. He uses cross-sectional data,
which is a "snap-shot" of the characteristics of the firms
and workers in each industry at the time of the survey.
Under conditions where the firm or the employee makes a
large investment in human capital, one would expect reduced
quits or layoffs due to the high cost associated with job
separation. It also follows that someone who is receiving a
higher wage from a specific firm than he could get elsewhere
is less likely to quit. From these observations Parsons
finds it necessary to divide human capital into worker
specific (worker pays to increase personal captial) or firm
financed. This is done to delineate between layoff behavior
of the firm and quit behavior of the individual.
Next, Parsons develops a theoretical model to determine
the firm's optimal choices with regards to quits, layoffs,
and wages, given specific market conditions. This firm
model is based on profit maximizing, where the wage rate,
number of trainees, and layoffs will provide the most exper-
ienced worker at least cost [Ref. 4, p. 1123]. Given this
assumption, he develops three functions:
1. Worker quit function.
2. Layoff/rehire cycle.
3. Supply of available trainees.
Since the objective of the firm is to maximize profits
and get the most experienced for the least cost, it is
necessary to take present value calculations of these
19
functions to determine if the employee mix reaches the
firm's desired rate of return. Having done this, Parsons
then develops a Lagrangian eguation and solves for the
optimal mix of employees, layoffs, and wages to maximize
profits.
2






= production function for firm
w = wage
s = supply schedule of trainees






D = slack variable
Z = past layoffs
6 = rate of return, for present value calculations
X = lagrangian multiplier
[Ref. 4, p. 1124]
Due to the mathematical sophistication of this model,
Parsons used non-linear programming technigues to solve for
the maximum condition of L. The derivation of this model is
left for the interested reader [Ref. 4, pp. 1125-1126].
There are three critical results developed from this
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empirical analysis. First, that firm-specific investments
reduce layoffs. In cases where direct layoffs cost are high
(i.e., high separation pay), the firm will have a reduced
incentive to layoff it's employees. Second, the slope of
the guit function will affect how the firm will reduce
employment, through layoffs or reduced hiring. The slope of
this function is dependent on how sensitive the firm is to
wage changes. Finally, the shape of the trainee supply
function will affect wages and employee mix. If this supply
function is wage-elastic, the firm should then attempt to
maintain its current labor stock and reduce turnover [Ref.
4] .
Parsons next utilizes regression analysis for the guit
rate and layoff rate for 47 manufacturing industries.
Separate regressions were run for each of the years 1959-
1963. The importance of these regressions is that the pre-
dicted signs for the variables under the specific human
capital theory, matched the signs of the coefficients from
the regression. To analyze the guit rate regression model,
Parsons used the following variables: wage (median salary),
professional (percent employees in professional occupation),
rural and south (percentage of employees living in these
areas). In the layoff rate regression model he uses wage,
education (median years of school), professional, brief
tenure (less than six months), capital per man (ratio of
value to average employment), 24 or younger (percentage of
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males 24 or less), white, south, and industry concentration
in his model. From all these variables which make up the
"test" of specific human capital, only proportion of work
force who are professionals did not match the sign predicted
using human capital theory. These results allow Parsons to
conclude, "that the specific human capital hypothesis for
layoff and guit rates is strongly confirmed." [Ref. 4, p.
1138]
In conclusion, Parsons' use of Lagrangian technigues to
solve for the firm specific maximum benefit from guits,
layoffs, and supply of trainees, solves the problem of
separating human capital of the firm's investment and the
individual's investment. The following regression analysis
then supports the hypothesis of his paper. Finally, I I
believe he substantiates that firm specific human captial
can be used to determine optimal labor turnover, and type
(guits or layoffs) to achieve a maximum desired return for
the company be it profit, productivity, or in the case of
the military, readiness.
C. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN QUITS
A study by Blau and Kahn [Ref. 5] attempts to determine
if there are any differences in the propensity to guit based
on race and sex differences.
In estimating the probability of guitting, Blau and Kahn
assume that "individuals seek to maximize their expected
22
discounted lifetime net search cost" [Ref. 5, p. 565]. They
consider the future probability of quitting to be a function
of the job offer distribution, search costs, the amount of
specific human capital, the present value of current job if
working, the probability of being layed off, and other
characteristics of the current job that makes it attractive"
[Ref. 5, p. 566]
.
Blau and Kahn then use Probit analysis to determine quit
probabilities as determined by race and sex. In their
results they found that the tenure variable was strongly
associated with the probability to quit for all race and sex
groups. Also, the variables used for current wage and long
term wage were significant and negative [Ref. 5, p. 570,
Table 2]. Other variables for education, experience, and
marital status were not significant. The only exception to
these was for white females whose education was significant
at the 5 percent level and positive. Additionally, for
white females being married was significant at the 5 percent
level and positive. This finding, while not noted by Blau
and Kahn, may reflect that white young females actually have
a higher propensity to quit because of social norms. Since
blacks, and specifically black women, are generally less
educated and are more likely to be single parents, their
costs of quitting should be higher. In my opinion, this
supports the estimation of separate quit functions based not
only on sex, but also on race.
23
Finally, Blau and Kahn take exception to two traditional
views. First, arguments that women, and possibly blacks,
are less concerned than white males about training and more
concerned about current wages [Ref. 5, p. 576]. Their
analysis shows this to be incorrect, since the long term
wage variable among all race and sex groups is greater than
the current gain in wages. This suggest that long-run earn-
ings are important in the considerations of job shifts by
youth [Ref. 5, p. 576], The second argument is that blacks
move from one unsatisfactory job to another and do not
experience job upgrade. Again, Blau and Kahn's results do
not support this, in fact, black males actually had higher
short run and long run wage gains by guitting. Blau and Kahn
note that this could have resulted from a censoring bias due
to the exclusion of those who failed to locate a new job
after guitting [Ref. 5, p. 577].
Viscussi [Ref. 6] looks at this same issue of sex dif-
ference in worker guitting. His study utilizes the 1975-76
University of Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics. He
examines the differences in male and female guitting based
on economic motivators. These motivators can be charac-
terized as age, race, marital status, and the injury rate
percentage of female workers in an industry. Viscussi then
looks to see if the data can be pooled (i.e., that the hypo-
thesis that male and female coefficients are identical)
[Ref. 6, p. 392]. Through the use of a Chi-sguare test, he
24
established that there is a difference in the coefficients
of male and female quit behavior and, therefore, one can
reject the previous hypothesis.
In Viscussi's results he finds that tenure is the most
important personal characteristic. He used two variables to
evaluate the effect of tenure on quitting. The first tenure
variable was a measure of years of experience and the second
was "tenurel", a dummy coded for those with less than one
year of experience with the firm and 1 otherwise.
Viscussi's results showed that for women with less than one
year of experience, their probability of quitting was almost
twice that of their male counterparts [Ref. 6, p. 392, Table
3] . These variables then reflect the elements of job match-
ing and human capital theory on worker quit probabilities.
These variables reflect three types of economic impacts:
1. Low tenure workers have less firm specific human capi-
tal so that foregone opportunities of changing jobs
are less.
2. Greatest period of worker learning occurs during
initial period of work.
3. Those with substantial work experience have revealed
themselves to be non-quitters [Ref. 6, p. 394].
Viscussi finds that marriage and children are the sta-
bilizing influences for both men and women, Interestingly,
"the entire predicted male-female quit difference and half
of the actual difference can be explained by differences in
job and regional economic conditions" [Ref. 6, p. 397].
Viscussi concluded that the propensity to quit overall is
25
more similar for men and women than originally believed.
Finally, he suggests that "if women had the same job charac-
teristics of men their guit rate would be below that for men
and their mean guit rate for the sample would be egual to
that of men" [Ref. 6, p. 397].
Meitzen's study [Ref. 7] attempts to model male and
female guitting models with "duration data on workers spells
of employments with firms sampled in the Employment Oppor-
tunities Pilot Program (EOPP) Employers Survey." His study
is unigue in that he utilizes a continuous time hazard
model, whereas Viscussi [Ref. 6] and others used discrete
time probit or logit models. Specifically, Meitzen uses the
Gompertz hazard function to "estimate the probability of
worker guits" [Ref. 7, p. 154].
In his results he finds that the tenure variable for
males has a significant and negative effect for male
guitting. For females, just the opposite occurs, with
tenure having a significant positive effect. These are the
exact opposite effects that one would expect from a tenure
variable. Meitzen concluded that the variables that were to
capture specific human capital were unable to do so because
a large percentage of the jobs of those in the sample were
training slots for more highly skilled jobs. Additionally,
since the EOPP looked primarily at workers in their initial
employment status, the firm specific human captial invest-
ments that keep individuals in a firm had yet to occur.
26
This suggests, then that the tenure effects "(sign)" is
correct for each, but a result of improper job matches
rather than human capital investments is responsible for the
sign and coefficients of the tenure variable.
With regard to the tenure issue, Meitzen discusses the
possible problem of heterogeneity in his sample.
Heterogeneity in a sample is when there are unmeasured dis-
similarities or inconsistencies in the overall group being
tested. For instance, if one wanted to replicate this study
for military officers in DoD, and used Army, Air Force,
Marines, and Navy in its sample, the tenure variable would
possibly reflect not only the effects of length of service,
but also inter-service differences of policy that affect
tenure. To test for this problem of heterogeneity, Meitzen
looks at his model in a reduced form using only the constant
term and the tenure variable. His results indicate that the
use of the other variables in his model altered the tenure
effect. He found that in his reduced form models the tenure
effect on males was only slightly more negative, and for fe-
males less positive and no longer significant [Ref. 7, p.
159] .
In determining the effect of wages on the guit decision
Meitzen used an innovative approach. He suggests that
people make a quit decision not based so much on their
current wage, but their potential "top wage." This would
imply that people routinely use present value calculations
27
in their decision to quit. He finds that this variable was
statistically significant and negative, on the probability
of quitting [Ref. 7, p. 162]. As a result of these
findings, he suggests, "that jobs with wage progressions act
as a self-selection device by which workers with lower
inherent propensities to quit will choose jobs with wage
progressions while workers with higher propensities to quit
will choose jobs with flat wage profiles" [Ref. 7, p. 163].
From this determination we see that "top wage" effects the
quit decision not from the side of present value of future
income, but as a result of a specific individual's inherent
propensity to quit. This makes the age variable somewhat
suspect, because its interpretation is clouded by a self-
selection bias of individuals before they enter into firms.
Meitzen found that the probability of quitting for males
decreased with tenure while increasing for females [Ref. 7,
p. 164]. This leads to the conclusion that job matching
process operates differently for females, and further
supports the need for estimating separate models for quits.
D. OTHER CIVILIAN STUDIES
Weiss [Ref. 8] uses utility theory in developing his
model for quit behavior. Simply, if an individual's
"expected utility from some alternative job offer, or from
leisure, exceeds his expected utility on his current job
enough to overcome the worker's pecuniary costs of quitting"
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the worker quits [Ref. 8, pp. 374-375]. To test his model
of quit behavior Weiss uses a sample of 2,341 production
workers hired in' either a southern or midwestern manufactur-
ing plant to do semi-skilled work. Wiess's sample contains
only entry level workers on the same wage scale, regardless
of age, schooling, previous experience, or job complexity.
The study by Meitzen [Ref. 7] reviewed above indicated
that tenure had a strong effect on quits. Also, recall that
Meitzen developed separate models for male and female quit
behavior. Weiss is unconventional in this aspect, using
neither of the previous approaches. Weiss attempts to alle-
viate the problem of difference in male/female quits with
respect to tenure by using only newly hired production
workers. Weiss argues that as tenure increases, the wage
tenure profile for men and women differ, and that employers
believe that women are more likely to quit and, therefore,
provide them with less training. As a result, in a sample
with men and women over long tenures, one would expect dif-
ferent quit propensities. Weiss hopes that by using these
new hires he can eliminate the tenure problem. This study,
however, fails to take into account two very critical ele-
ments in job selection; first, firm specific human capital
brought with new hires to firms, and second, self-selection
bias of individuals into jobs with lower wage profiles.
Weiss in his analysis of the data expects three types of
factors to affect the probability of a worker quitting:
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1. Factors that might be good predictors of alternative
opportunities, such as race, education, and where the
worker is employed.
2. Factors correlated with satisfaction on the initial
job in (1), plus job complexity, the match between
worker's job and education level, and a dummy variable
to determine whether the worker quit a job to take the
job concerned with here.
3. Factors that affect cost of quitting, such as material
status, and unobserved characteristics that previously
had affected the length of school chosen by an
individual. Proxies used were high school graduation
and education [Ref. 8, p. 379].
Given these factors are all relevant to the quit
decision, Weiss acknowledges that by restricting the study
to newly hired workers and holding tenure constant at zero,
that correlation between the error terms in the tenure and
quit equations is probaby high, the bias is strong (Ref. 9,
p. 374). However, Weiss argues that the high wages paid to
the workers causes the bias to be small. Weiss does include
a variable for previous experience, he does not delineate
the types of previous work skills. It seems reasonable,
that there would be major problems with job matches between
those with previous experience as semi-skilled workers as
opposed to those who are not. Those with no experience may
have a totally different propensity to quit. This quit then
would be due primarily to a job mismatch and not a quit
decision based on the individual's utility derived from the
job. This is a major problem in his study. It seems more
reasonable that to reduce the effect of tenure being corre-
lated with the error structure, one should use an approach
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eliminating those with short or long amounts of tenure from
the sample as done by Solnick [Ref. 9],
Another area of interest, is Weiss' s analysis of what
affect job complexity has on quits. He finds that assigning
workers to more complex jobs does not increase job satisfac-
tion - job complexity is positively correlated with quit
propensity [Ref. 8, p. 372]. In semi-skilled labor, more
complexity implies greater dexterity and individual concen-
tration (i.e., harder work for the same wage), so it follows
that job complexity would be a factor that would affect the
quit decision in a positive manner.
Weiss acknowledges the following statistical problems in
his study:
1. The use of a Probit estimation procedure relies heavi-
ly on the assumption that the error term is normally
distributed and homoscedastic (the error term has a
constant variance).
2. Assumed education was a function solely of stick-
to-itiveness . (More realistically, it is reflective
of human capital investment.)
3. The sample suffers from sample selection bias [Ref. 8,
p. 383]
.
Given these limitations, which are to a certain extent a
function of available data, Weiss used a Probit analysis of
quit probabilities and compared the predictors of his model
with conventional "Folk Wisdom." In his results he con-
cludes that:
31
1. Individuals who drop out of high school, ceteris
paribus , are approximately twice as likely to quit
these jobs.
2. Lower quit rates of workers, employed when the applied
for the job being monitored can be explained by dif-
ferences in worker satisfaction with present job.
3. Workers assigned to more complex jobs are more like to
quit than are workers assigned to simpler jobs [Ref.
8, pp. 385-386] .
Solnick's study [Ref. 9] of a large manufacturing firm
is first unique in the sense that he defines his study group
as an internal labor market divided into non-competing
entities. It appears that Solnick implicitly assumes a
restrictive allocative structure wherein the rules which de-
termine the promotion distribution within the firm are well
defined. I believe this is an accurate assumption in that
the study also attempts to analyze the effect of promotions
on quits within non-competing groups.
Solnick first established the following hypothesis:
1. Absence of promotion, ceteris parabus , increases the
likelihood of a quit.
2. The more homogeneous the group, the smaller this
effect will be [Ref. 9, p. 2].
Next, Solnick establishes as the basis for these hypo-
theses a model developed on the theory of utility maximiza-
tion mentioned earlier. To develop variables to determine
measures of utility he utilizes proxies such as pay and per-
formance ratings, which individuals use to assess the
probability of their eventual promotion.
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Solnick developed the following model to estimate the
promotion effect on quits:
QUIT = F(personal attributes affecting productivity, job
characteristics, family responsibilities, vested
pension benefits, personal risk) [Ref. 9, p. 10].
This model contains many of the classification variables
previously mentioned. However, Solnick deletes employees
with very short or long tenure from his sample. This is
done because those who chose not to quit each year have a
different average value of risk preference. As a result,
the error term in the quit model would be correlated with
the tenure variable, resulting in biased parameter
estimates. Therefore, by eliminating these employees
Solnick is reducing self-selection bias.
In the final phase of the paper Solnick utilizes Logit
analysis to estimate the coefficients of the variables
selected based on his model. He does this for the entire
sample and then breaks it up into three subgroups, defined
by their functional area, major field of study, and salary
grade. This is done to support the second hypothesis with
regards to homogeneity of samples reducing the effect of
promotions on quits. This approach did not provide conclu-
sive results as to the overall effect of promotions due to
smaller sample sizes.
This raises the question of how did Solnick deal with
the problem of heterogeneity in his initial model. Of
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particular interest would be what effect, if any, did heter-
ogeneity have on performance ratings and variables that
proxy the cost of guitting. One might expect that one
specific group may be of more value to a firm than another,
and as a result, receive inflated performance evaluations as
a management tool for retention. Also, the cost of guitting
would be different by occupation, as a result of the dif-
ferent amounts of human capital investments. As an example,
an engineer's degree may reguire more of a human capital
investment than an accountant. Yet, with uncertainty in the
literature with how to deal with the problem of unmeasured
heterogeneity, Solnick's approach seems reasonable. In
addition, since his variables dealing with human capital
(degrees in computer science, accounting, and finance) are
strongly significant in his model, one would expect the
problem of heterogeneity to have little effect on Solnick's
overall conclusion.
Firms trying to satisfy employees but facing increasing
direct wage costs, turn to other benefits to try to compen-
sate their labor force. Specifically, certain fringe bene-
fits may act as a deterrent to guitting. Mitchell [Ref. 10]
uses a panel data set from the Quality of Employment Survey
(QES) conducted by the University of Michigan Research
Center. This survey contained individual level data on
worker's earnings, job characteristics, human capital,
availability of several fringe benefits, and [Ref. 10,
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p. 289] . With this data, Mitchell looks at the effect of
fringe benefits on job changes. It is reasonable to assume
that "Fringe benefits are not usually portable across jobs
and are thus described as deterrents to mobility [Ref. 10,
p. 282]." In her model the decision to guit is "the differ-
ence between total current compensation and that available
for an alternative job: D = Cc -Ca . "Therefore, the
greater the difference between Cc and Ca , the less likely is
a job change [Ref. 10, p. 288]."
In her sample Mitchell found that guits accounted for
about half of all job changes, the other types of separa-
tions included layoffs or discharges [Ref. 10, p. 291]. She
then utilizes Probit analysis to examine the effect of
fringe benefits on guits and total mobility. Through the
application of human capital theory she suggests that higher
wages now, should deter guits in the future. In her model
the wage effect was significantly negative if she omitted
variables accounting for fringe benefits. This led to the
conclusion that, "the deterrent effect of wages on guits
found in previous studies (for example, Parsons [Ref. 5])
which omit fringes may be overstated [Ref. 10, p. 294].
The empirical results from her study support three main
conclusions
:
1. Mobility is lower for workers with fringe benefits.
2. Higher wages reduce a worker's guit probability.
3. Quit patterns differ by sex [Ref. 10, p. 291].
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Mitchell also points out in her conclusions that fringe
benefits were "robust" to the inclusion of other variables.
I found this a particularly relevent fact of job satisfac-
tion theory as applied to the military. In the service an
individual has an extensive fringe benefit plan and is
vested for retirement after twenty years of service. This
study supports the idea that lower military compensation as
compared to the civilian wage is offset by fringe benefits
and should reduce quits. This brings up an important policy
question in that should the military or civilian firms
increase fringe benefits and not direct compensation to
reduce quits?
E. MILITARY STUDIES OF QUIT BEHAVIOR
Buddin [Ref. 11] analyzes the background charac-
teristics, prior experience, and initial job satisfaction
with military assignment of enlistees during their initial
transition to military life. The research looks at how
these factors affect attrition of male recruits. The analy-
sis is done using the 1979 Survey of Personnel Entering
Active Duty and the Services Enlisted Master and Loss Files
[Ref. 11, p. 1], Unlike studies of quit behavior in the
civilian economy done by Parsons, Solnick, and others which
must delineate job separation in terms of quits, layoffs, or
fires, the military separation classification becomes fuzzy
due to the unique character of initial lonq term contracts.
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"The premise underlying economic models of job-separation is
that the employer or employee anticipates that a separation
will enhance his well being [Ref. 11, p. 2]." In the
military, however, the member has no "free choice" to quit
until the end of his current contract. Therefore, those
separated early fall into the category of substandard be-
havior problems, physical disabilities, and special cases of
family emergency. This separation policy makes it difficult
to distinguish between quits and fires (those discharged for
behavioral problems) because dissatisfied service members
have an incentive to induce firing as a last resort to
ending their contract.
Buddin applies the theories of specific human capital
and job matching theory to analyze enlistment profiles and
patterns of early attrition. Using social security numbers
Buddin merged the 1979 AFEES survey file with the personnel
records from the Defense Manpower Data Center ( DMDC ) in
order to establish a file containing a longitudinal history
of individuals in the AFEES survey [Ref. 11, p. 14]. Buddin
utilizes a logistic regression model to evaluate the sepa-
rate effects of individual factors to the overall early
attrition level. The use of a least squares regression
model v/as deemed inappropriate because the dependent
variables, indicating discharged in the first six months or
not, has a Bernoulli distribution (the dependent variable
equals or 1) [Ref. 11, Appendix 4, p. 53].
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Among his results Buddin found that early attrition
rates increase with age in the Army, Navy, and Marines. He
found that this age effect was most prominent in the Marines
where the early attrition rate of seventeen year olds was
6.0 percent and for nineteen year old was 17.6 percent [Ref.
11, p. 17]. From this result Buddin suggests the possi-
bility that loss rates during the first six months could be
reduced by attracting younger recruits. This conclusion
lacked insight into the possible affect that, younger
enlistees first enter the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) for up
to one year before beginning their actual contract.
However, their entry age is recorded at the time of
contract. So, this initial conclusion is tenuous.
Next, applying job matching theory to recruits, he sug-
gests that those entering with past spells of unemployment
or frequent job changes are more likely to separate. Those
recruits who are older and fall into this category of fre-
quent unemployment and job separations are referred to as
"labor market lemons."
In using participation in the DEP for recruits, there
were lower overall early attritions in all services than
non-participants. This supports the fact that using age
alone as an indicator of success is faulty. However, Buddin
believes that "interdependencies among many of the variables
may mask the underlying link between any given variable and
early attrition in the DEP." [Ref. 11, p. 21].
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In conclusion, Buddin compares his multivariate model
for military job separations with civilians. The most sur-
prising result was the age factor, with younger recruits
less likely to attrite than older recruits. Similarities to
other studies exist in that not having a high school diploma
almost doubles the possibility of early attrition. Work
histories such as previous experience and variables for
minority status also had comparable military/civilian
effects. Finally, he found that variables measuring job
satisfaction had an insignificant effect on determining
early attrition.
Bosel and Johnson [Ref. 12] investigate the factors
associated with a service member's decision to remain in or
leave the military. The data from this study are focused on
the separation/retention decision of enlisted members of the
four Armed Services at the time of their reenlistment . To
address the attrition guestion Bosel and Johnson adopted a
dual approach. First they reviewed existing studies and
survey research. This was done to establish corroborating
evidence as to what factors affect attrition. Second, they
conducted original analysis with information supplied to
them by the individual services. The Army provided reports
of their 1981 and 1983 omnibus surveys of military personnel
along with analysis of its 1983 survey of separating
members. The Navy and Air Force provided computer data and
documentation from their respective separation and retention
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survey [Ref. 12, p. 2]. The Marine Corps had no recent data
on retention. One should remain suspect of this data, since
its validity, reliability, and objectivity is subject to
specific service classification policies on separation. It
is possible for two individuals to be separated for the same
reason but classified differently by their respective
service
.
Bosel and Johnson take a labor market view of those
factors that will affect quitting, "in this process each
employee brings to the labor market his or her own package
of attributes, which can be understood as combinations of
values," [Ref. 12, p. 6]. Each of these given values will
result in a positive or negative effect for an individual
toward a given job. This package of attributes can be seen
as the individual characteristics and attributes which
represents the individuals value to the firm. Within this
labor market framework Bosel and Johnson attempt to explain




3. Pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors
[Ref. 12, 10] .
Bosel and Johnson evaluate reenlistment and attrition
separately. The literature on reenlistment closely
parallels the elements of my thesis evaluating quit
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decisions, and it assumed to be a decision that resides with
the service member. While attrition as defined by Bosel and
Johnson, has the termination decision as residing with the
military [Ref. 12, p. 11]. Therefore, I will focus here on
the elements affecting the reenlistment decision, since in
my thesis I later plan to develop a choice based model.
Bosel and Johnson begin their analysis of factors that
affect the reenlistment decision by looking at pecuniary
factors. Within this, they "consider the marginal effects
of several different types of service incentives."
1. Base pay and allowances
2. Bonuses
3. Promotions
4. Deferred compensation such as retirement
[Ref. 12, p. 12]
.
Through an extensive literature review Bosel and Johnson
conclude that the pecuniary variables are assumed to be the
most important and obvious determinents of reenlistment
behavior [Ref. 12, p. 20]. Their study looks at studies
done by Warner 1981, Chow and Polich 1980, Goldberg and
Warner 1982, and others. [Ref. 12, pp. 13-19]
Bosel and Johnson then review research data on the
effects of non-pecuniary factors, and find three specific
areas of interest:
1. Location and relocation process
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2. Job characteristics (defined in terms of functions of
their work)
3. Individual characteristics
With respect to the location relocation process, Bosel
and Johnson reviewed individual services exit surveys, which
generally ask those leaving the service to rank in order the
reason why they were leaving. For the Army, being separated
from spouse and family ranked third, and for the Navy,
first. The Air Force provided a response of a desire for
more geographical stability which ranked third [Ref. 12, p.
21]. In addition, I found from the Marine Corps 1986 exit
survey, that family separation ranked seventh among reasons
to leave. These surveys all indicated that service members
are generally dissatisfied with the location/relocation
process. From this information one may hypothesize that the
location and relocation process plays an important role in
the decision to leave the military. However, these surveys
are biased in that they are made up of a population that has
already exited the services. The fact may be that those
that remain in the military are egually dissatisfied with
the process, yet stay for other reasons.
It is reasonable to assume that an individual's satis-
faction with his work and the characteristics of that work
should effect the quit decision. Bosel and Johnson reviewed
work done by Penny (1971), Fletcher (1981), and Hiller
(1982) [Ref. 12, pp. 25-26]. From these studies Bosel and
Johnson were able to reach no strong conclusions. It
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did appear, however, that job satisfaction played a role in
the quit decision.
The next area of concern to Bosel and Johnson was those
individual characteristics effecting the reenlistment
decision. They focused on traditional variables used in
other studies that used measures of education or test
scores, sex, race, marital status and number of dependents,
and attitudes [Ref. 12, pp. 28-30]. These variables have
appeared in studies of quit behavior of individuals in the
civilian labor market and have been generally accepted as
relevant elements in determining quit behavior.
Finally, Bosel and Johnson use data from the Air Force,
Navy, and Army Exit Surveys to estimate retention models.
They acknowledge the weaknesses of these data as a low
response rate in the exit survey, and that the respondents
are only those leaving the services. Thus, these data cannot
shed light on factors to distinguish leavers from stayers
[Ref. 12, p. 35]. From the models estimated (apparently OLS
but not specified) Bosel and Johnson reach the following
conclusion on individual characteristic variables:
1. Education and Test Scores - Evident that those who
have related deficits in education and test levels are
more likely to attrite [Ref. 12, p. 57].
2. Age - That there is no reason to believe that a rela-
relative lack of maturity is a cause of attrition
[Ref. 12, p. 59]
.
3. Marital Status and Dependents - Data concerning these
effects were inconsistent [Ref. 12, p. 59].
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4. Attitudes - Strong association between attrition and
previous behavorial problems [Ref. 12, p. 60].
Blandin [Ref. 13] studies non-high school graduates
(NHSG), non-prior service (NPS) males who entered the Army
in Fiscal Years 1974 to 1976. These data were chosen for
two principle reasons:
1. FY-74 group represented first full year of All-
Volunteer Force (AVF) experience and as such there
were no draftees.
2. There were reasonable enlistment attrition statistics
for those individuals who enlisted in 1976 [Ref. 13,
p. 5] .
Blandin' s research focuses on two related views:
1. Trying to identify predictors that are associated with
individual success in completing one full enlisted
tour.
2. Recruiting from labor market segments which histori-
cally have not been heavily recruited. As an example
the increased substitution of women for men in
selected MOSs [Ref. 13, p. 2].
Since historically the attrition rate for NHSG-NPS indi-
viduals is higher than for those with high school degrees,
Blandin attempts to develop a predictive model that would
allow for the identification of low attrition risk people
from the NHSG-NPS group. In selecting variables for his
model Blandin uses a Chi-sguare analysis to determine which
variables were independently associated with the dependent
variable attrition [Ref. 13, p. 6]. From this analysis
Blandin selected variables based on an individual's race,
highest year of education completed, month entered the Army,
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age, census region, and Armed Forces Qualification Test
Group Score (AFQT).
Blandin next decided to group the data in his sample due
to the large number of observations (180,000) and to reduce
computational expense [Ref. 13, p. 8]. Having decided this,
Blandin then decides to estimate both a linear regression
model and a logistic regression model. However, since his
dependent variable is attrition/non-attrition, a or 1
variable, there is a probability that the predicted value
may fall out of this range. In cases such as this, the
logistic model is preferred on the theoretical ground's that
the underlying function is not linear. Blandin argues that
"the ultimate choice between the two (logistic or linear)
depends on how well each represents the data to which they
are fitted [Ref. 13, p. 10]."
Another problem that Blandin encounters is that by
grouping his data there may exist heteroscedasticity . This
could then effect the model's ability to estimate the para-
meters of the selected variables. Blandin counters this
effect by transforming the data so that the error term has a
constant variance [Ref. 13, p. 10].
The results in the linear model led to four general
conclusions
:
1. Years of education even among NHS population are posi-
tively and significantly associated with the proba-
bility of staying.
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2. Age is associated with attrition (the older, the less
the probability of attriting)
.
3. Census regions are associated with attrition.
4. Higher AFQT standing, the less the probability of
guitting [Ref. 13, pp. 11-14].
The result that age was a positive and significant vari-
able contradicts findings made by Buddin [Ref. 1]. Buddin
had found that older recruits would have a higher proba-
bility of leaving. I believe what Blandin has found more
specifically by using only NHSG-NPS in his sample, is that
the job matching theory and classif icaiton of older indi-
viduals as "labor market lemons" does not apply. This re-
sult is suspect, however, since there is no variable in his
model to account for previous work experience or unemploy-
ment encountered by individuals in the civilian labor
market. The results that increased education and AFQT group
reduce the probability is consistent with other studies of
guit behavior.
The logistic model yielded results that were consistent
with the linear model in terms of the relationship between
the independent variables and attrition, leading to the same
general conclusions as above.
Finally, Blandin uses the 1976 Fiscal Year cohort to
test the predictive ability and compare the results for each
model. The individuals in this cohort were first evaluated
as to the likelihood of their non-attrition and then ranked
into groups ranging from the top 1,000, 1,000-2,000,
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2,000-5,000, and so on. The results from both models were
essentially identical when tested.
Blandin provides three conclusions from the empirical
results of his study:
1. Individuals with different attribute profiles also
differ with respect to their probability of quitting.
2. On a relative basis, "good bets" from "poor bets" can
be differentiated.
3. Both models do a slightly better overall prediction
job, compared to either education or AFQT group as a
selection criteria [Ref. 13, p. 20].
Elster and Flyer [Ref. 14] studied Non-Prior Service
(NPS) enlisted personnel to determine loss probabilities
given selected entry factors. The population studied con-
sisted of all non-prior service accessions entering active
service during Fiscal Year 1973 through 1978 [Ref. 14, p.
14]. The data was provided from the DMDC cohort files and
included accession records and personnel inventory loss
files. The entry variables used were service, sex, race,
education level, age, marital status, AFQT group, and area
of residence prior to enlistment. The attrition rates were
first estimated for each service and DoD overall for the
first three years of service. Elster and Flyer's objective
is to provide information on loss probabilities that may be
used as a screen by recruiters to reduce the high cost of
attrition
.
Elster and Flyer's results confirm those made by the
Comptroller General in his February 1980 report to Congress.
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They found that of attrition occurring in the first three
years of service, about half takes place in the first twelve
months [Ref. 14, Table 3, p. 18]. The reasons for separa-
tion are also a result of a reenlistee's inability to meet
the behavorial or performance standards of the military
[Ref. 14, Table 4, p. 19]. Next, Elster and Flyer develop a
comprehensive set of tables accounting for attrition by
race, education level, marital status, age, and AFQT group.
Following are some Marine Corps specific items of interest.
For a more comprehensive review the interested reader should
review the work with emphasis on the tables on pages 17-66.
For the Marine Corps they found that black enlistees
have about a ten percent higher attrition rate than non-
blacks [Ref. 14, p. 26]. This race variable I would also
anticipate to effect the guit decision at the end of service
if there exists an ineguality of treatment by race. Given
the previous evidence that blacks have a higher attrition
rate, it is not surprising to find that blacks have also a
higher attrition rate than non-blacks for performance/
behavior problems [Ref. 14, p. 28]. Part of this race
effect, I believe, may be accounted for by endemic charac-
teristics of the data collection period. During the early
to mid-seventies in the Marine Corps as well as other
services, racial discord was a common occurrence. However,
I believe that through extensive programs and education, all
services had reduced this race effect, by the early 1980' s.
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Therefore, some of these loss probabilities are now suspect
and should be reworked from data starting after 1980.
Among the results for attrition rates by education
level, AFQT category, and race, blacks had a generally
higher attrition rate. However, after controlling for edu-
cation level and AFQT group, the difference in attrition
rates was small in every service except the Marine Corps
[Ref. 14, 34], This result also suggests some external
factors as effecting the results.
Attrition rates by marital status show that both male
and female recruits who are married at the time of their
enlistment are more likely to attrite than those who are
single [Ref. 14, p. 43]. For all services this effect was
most pronounced for Marine Corps recruits and most probably
a result of the expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps,
and frequent moves and demands placed on the new recruit.
Elster and Flyer's results on the effect of age on
attrition were interesting, and supported those found by
Buddin [Ref. 11]. For males and females, seventeen year
olds had higher attrition rates than eighteen or nineteen
year olds. Yet high attrition rates are generally experi-
enced by older male enlistees [Ref. 14, p. 67]. This sup-
ports Buddin's findings, and is in line with job matching
theory that older recruits are enlisting as a means of last




When recruits were grouped by their home state at time
of enlistement, attrition rates would vary by racial group
and sex. The general finding was that within racial or gen-
der groups, states with higher attrition rates are generally
the same for men and women and for high school graduates and
non-graduates [Ref. 14, p. 68].
From the extensive statistical analysis done, Elster and
Flyer conclude, "that the prediction of attrition from indi-
vidual information can be improved significantly by taking
into account interactions among such factors as service,
sex, race, education level, age, marital status, AFQT group,
and home area of enlistment." [Ref. 14, p. 69].
In an annex to this report Elster and Flyer test to see
if there is a relationship between the Delayed Entry Program
(DEP) and attrition. The DEP is a recruiting management
tool utilized by the services to get new recruits enlisted
in the specialty of their choice, primarily a school timing
issue. This analysis looked at total time spent in DEP and
failed to take into account specific specialties indi-
vidual's would be trained for. This would be important in
the event an individual's potential skill became available
in the civilian market while waiting in the DEP. "The dif-
ferences in attrition rates by time in DEP are very large
for male recruits, and appear to tap motivational and other
factors not well measured by other enlistment information
[Ref. 5, p. 74]." Therefore, Elster and Flyer conclude that
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this element should be included in any composite score used
to predict attrition of an entry group [Ref. 14, p. 74],
Lang's [Ref. 15] study looks at the Marine Corps acces-
sion policy for granting waivers to recruit applicants who
fail to meet enlistment standards. The problem as stated
realizes that from 1978 to 1984 there has been a steady
increase in the number of waivers granted [Ref. 15, p. vii].
An objective of this thesis is to determine what impact the
granting of waivers may have down the line, and if any cor-
relation exists between those granted waivers and those who
separate at the end of their enlistment.
Waiver Classifications in the Marine Corps can be placed




2. Number of dependents






The "moral qualification" category includes both criminal
and non-criminal offenses [Ref. 15, p. 1].
The methodological approach to this study was to compute
the number and type of waivers granted during each fiscal
year and try to establish if any trend exists. The empiri-
cal results of the analysis indicated that the primary
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increase in waivers was due to an increase in minor traffic
violations [Ref. 15, Table 4, p. 2]. An individual who
receives six traffic tickets needs a waiver to enter. Given
this number, the report concludes that the increase in
waivers may be a function of increased police enforcement,
or computerization and better reporting systems.
Next, the study tries to isolate if the effect of grant-
ing a waiver will increase the probability that an indi-
vidual will be separated early from the Marine Corps. This
is done by comparing those with no waivers who separated
early to those with waivers who separated early. The re-
sults indicated that for those granted waivers for minor
traffic violations, no difference existed; but, for other
moral waivers there was a difference [Ref. 15, Tables 5 and
6, p. 5]
.
May's [Ref. 16] research estimates the cost that the
Marine Corps incurs when first-term enlisted personnel leave
the service. The expected cost of attrition is calculated
for several personnel categories that are defined according
to levels of education and ability [Ref. 16, p. iii]. The
rates of attrition used in this study were calculated from
the Headquarters Marine Corps Enlisted Master File.
May defines the cost of attrition to be equal to all
expenses of replacing an individual minus any investment
recouping that may be made by keeping initial wages low
[Ref. 16, p. 1]. Next, May divides the enlistment period
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into the following categories: Delayed Entry Program (DEP),
Boot Camp Training, Initial Skill Training, and remaining
enlistment. These all appear to be reasonable breaks in the
first enlistment and each has unique characteristics making
one anticipate different probable attrition rates in each
phase
.
DEP attrition occurs between the period an individual
signs an enlistment contract with the Marine Corps but is
placed in a waiting pool, until actually being "shipped" off
to start his active service. May found that attrition from
the DEP varies across personnel types, and that attrition
does not appear to be highly correlated with education level
[Ref. 16, p. 7]. Next, controlling for both education and
ability, revealed that the DEP attrition level did not vary
across ability levels within specific education groups [Ref.
16, p. 11] .
To determine total cost of DEP attrition May assumes
that recruiting is made up primarily of variable cost. The
costs for advertising, enlistment bonuses, and recruiter
training are all treated as fixed costs. Therefore, if one
wants to determine the costs of recruiting an individual
they would have to know the time spent by the recruiter and
the quality of recruit. Since the cost of recruiting a high
quality or low quality person is not directly known, May
estimated the cost by using an enlistment-supply equation
for hiqh and low quality recruits [Ref. 16, p. 12]. The
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total expected cost of DEP attrition was estimated to be the
marginal cost of recruiting, times the attrition rate.
Previously, May had stated that attrition rates varied
across personnel types, by education and ability. To
account for this the final DEP cost equations were then
divided and estimated separately by quality of recruit,
education, and ability [Ref. 16, p. 14].
Most of the attrition that occurs happens within the
first twelve months of service (Elster and Flyer [Ref. 5]),
and of that, most occurs during Boot Camp [Ref. 16, p. 15]
.
The attrition rate was found to be lower for high school
graduates than for those with GED's or non-graduates.
However, May found no distinct pattern in the variation of
attrition levels across ability groups [Ref. 16, p. 16].
The cost to the Marine Corps for a Boot Camp attrition is
then equal to the cost to recruit and train a replacement up
to the point where that individual separated. (The esti-
mated 1985 cost of an individual who completes boot camp is
$5,404.00 [Ref. 10, Appendix C] ) . The average time in boot
camp before attrition was calculated to be 48 percent of
completion of the course. Therefore, the Marine Corps
spends .48 x 5404 = $2,637.00 to train and replace, to the
level of the average individual who leaves [Ref. 16, p.
16] .
Initial skill training length is dependent upon an indi-
vidual MOS , It can vary from six weeks of infantry training
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to two years for aviation electronic technicians. The
average time in initial training schools is approximately 83
days. May found that attrition from initial skill training
is generally low, and occurs approximately one-third of the
way through training [Ref. 16, p. 17]. May, also found that
attrition did increase as an individual's ability level went
down. To calculate the attrition costs from initial skill
training May takes one-third of the average initial training
cost and adds boot camp costs to come up with $7,320.00 to
replace an individual who attrites from initial skill train-
ing [Ref. 16, p. 18]. I found this somewhat suspect, be-
cause May failed to identify if those who attrite from one
initial skill were sent to another, thereby saving the boot
camp cost. This calculation is also questionable, because
the Marine Corps rarely separates individuals on the grounds
of failing initial skill training. Additionally, an initial
skill training attrition does not necessarily equal a ser-
vice attrition, and this distinction is not brought out in
May's research.
Finally, attrition during the remainder of the first
term enlistment was found to vary significantly across edu-
cational level and ability [Ref. 16, p. 19]. Since post
training attrition is more difficult to predict, a cost
equation would need to reflect the recouped cost the Marine
Corps has made. However, since one cannot easily measure
the economic output, the degree of investment recouping is
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difficult to distinguish. Therefore, May assumes that the
Marine Corps recoups its investment evenly over the post-
period training [Ref. 16, p. 22]. Using average individual
post-training attrition May estimates the cost to replace
the individual to be $11,686.00 in 1985 dollars.
In conclusion, the cost of attrition is dependent on
quality of recruits desired and the timing of their
separation. In 1985, attrition costs for the Marine Corps
were estimated to be from $2,194.00 to $6,908.00 per
contract. Since the Marine Corps recruits 40,000 people a
year, the annual cost of attrition is in excess of $87
million dollars [Ref. 16, p. 24].
Chow and Polich [Ref. 17] use the 1976 DoD personnel
survey in developing and measuring factors in the reenlist-
ment decision. In developing a framework for their
analysis, they attempt to estimate reenlistment based on
personal characteristics, and policy relevant variables.
The decision to reenlist is viewed basically as a supply
side question, where the decision to stay or leave is
voluntary. However, Chow and Polich astutely recognize that
there exists some distortion in the data because demand side
factors affect some peoples decision to reenlist. As a
result of constraints on individuals, be they based on rank,
occupational specialty, or lack of recommendation from a
commander, they were barred from reenlistment. It is diffi-
cult to capture the leave/stay decision by looking at inter-
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service separation codes because many times an individual
advised that he will not be able to stay, simply does not
attempt to reenlist and is, therefore, classified the same
as someone who decided not to reenlist. To make this dis-
tinction requires the use of reenlistment codes given to
individuals on separation, this was not available to Chow
and Polich in their data. To omit people who would have
been most subject to ineligibility for reenlistment, Chow
and Polich exclude those who have not reached at least pay-
grade E-4 [Ref. 17, p. 6],
Chow and Polich concentrate on measuring factors that
affect the reenlistment decision, which are subject to con-
trol by the DoD, such as military compensation and the work
environment. The value of military compensation is a factor
that is greatly misunderstood by the enlisted force, but
repeatedly throughout studies appears as a major factor in
the reenlistment decision. To understand how the charcter-
istics of military pay affect reenlistments , Chow and Polich
examine pay in four aspects:
1. Precise measure of real military income (RMC) based on
pay grade, years of service, and dependency status.
2. Measure of RMC including a method to distinguish the
effects of pay given in cash, versus pay given in kind
benefits
.
3. Construction of a variable representing people's
perceptions of the value of their RMC, as opposed to
actual value.
4. A measure of the reenlistment bonus available to each
member of the sample [Ref. 17, p. 14]
.
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In using the "precise measure" of RMC, Chow and Polich
calculate the actual cash income to the individual to in-
clude allowances for housing and subsistance. However, in
the junior enlisted grades there is normally no actual cash
outlay, but the benefits are given out "in kind" such as
mess hall facilities and barracks. There is no choice for a
single individual in his first term, he must take in kind
benefits. Given that the population of first term enlistees
is primarily single, I guestion the validity of including
these elements as a precise measure of RMC. This point is a
major contention among junior enlistees who would prefer the
cash benefit so they could decide on the guality mix of
goods that give them the highest benefit. So strictly
speaking, this factor fails to capture RCM as a precise
measure for the majority of those in the data base.
The "perceived" cash value of RMC was found to be under-
valued by those in the service [Ref. 17, p. 17]. Chow and
Polich propose several reasons to explain this effect:
1. The complexitry of the pay system, including in kind
payments and invisible tax advantage.
2. Most income surveys find people underreport their
income, so not surprising for military.
3. A measure of the reenlistment bonus available to each
member of the sample [Ref. 17, p. 14],
The military's use of reenlistment bonuses is a recent
compensation tool used to manage manpower levels with a
specific interest on MOS fields with a critical shortage.
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The bonus programs offer a cash amount equal to a "multiple"
for a specific occupational, specialty, times one months base
pay, times the number of years reenlisted. Chow and Polich
do not use the total cash amount received to represent the
bonus, but rather decide to represent the potential bonus
per year [Ref. 17, p. 20].
Having developed factors that account for wage effects
for their model, Chow and Polich next select indicators of
civilian earnings opportunities, the service environment,
and attitudes about the military to complete their model.
The variables representing civilian opportunities in-
clude demographic measures seen in previous studies, i.e.,
education, race, sex, AFQT group, and MOS . To evaluate the
service environment, Chow and Polich looked at aspects of
location, inside or outside of the U.S., time spent at work,
and imbalance (overcrowding) within a specialty. To esti-
mate attitudes toward the military Chow and Polich attempted
to find to what degree of volunteerism did those in the
sample originally enlist. This effect was due primarily to
many "draft induced" volunteers in the data base of the mid-
seventies. An interesting current measure in today's All-
Volunteer Force may be to determine to what extent indi-
viduals are "economic conscripts" as a result of the high
percentage of minority representation in the services.
In estimating the parameters for the reenlistment model,
Chow and Polich used a method known as the discriminant
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function technique [Ref. 17, p. 27]. The regression results
from the analysis, are as follows. Those who perceived
larger values of RMC are more likely to reenlist. A higher
tendency to reenlist was found among those living in mili-
tary housing with dependents than others. That the demo-
graphic variables of sex, education, race, and mental
ability appear to measure the potential of getting a desir-
able civilian job. Finally, that the affect of a bonus was
smaller than the affect for the same wage increase in RMC
[Ref. 17, pp. 28-33]
.
Warner and Goldberg's [Ref. 18] study on non-pecuniary
factors influencing the reenlistment decision of Navy per-
sonnel categorized Navy occupational specialties into 16
groups and tried to estimate the elasticity of labor supply
for each. One of the major factors affecting the reenlist-
ment decision in the Navy is sea duty. A 1987 Navy Times
release indicated the results of Navy exit surveys among en-
listed personnel which rated "sea duty and family
separation" as the number one reason for their decision to
leave. Warner and Goldberg formulate an economic model of
the reenlistment decision, based on the theory of utility
maximization which attempts to annualize the cost of leaving
the service for an individual. This annualized cost of
leaving (ACOL) model is unique in that it takes into account
not only demographic and compensation factors, but also
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includes a "taste" factor to measure preferrability of
military to civilian life [Ref. 18, p. 27],
Warner and Goldberg assume that the reenlistment supply
function is normally distributed with mean y and variance
a . They note that, "the supply curve becomes more elastic
as the variance of the difference between military and
civilian taste factor decreases, and that the elasticity of
supply reaches infinity under two conditions:
1. When military and civilian taste factors between indi-
viduals become more similar and when the variance
approaches zero.
2. When military and civilian taste factors are highly
correlated and become perfect substitutes for one
another. [Ref. 18, p. 28]
Under the first condition occupational supply curves be-
come more elastic the less the dispersion in taste across
individuals. Under the second condition, civilian and mili-
tary employment are viewed as close substitutes for one
another and the elasticity of supply will be high. [Ref.
18, p. 28]
.
The data for this study was taken from the FY-1974 to
FY-1978 DMDC files on all Navy personnel who made a reen-
listment decision. Next, the personnel in the data were
divided into 16 occupational groups. To test the theory on
the effects of non-pecuniary elements, Warner and Goldberg
estimated probit reenlistment eguations for each specialty
[Ref. 18, p. 29]. The empirical analysis showed probit
results for specification of the model that included
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ACOL calculated over the horizon of a 4-year reenlistment
[Ref . 14, Table 2, p. 32]
.
From the result of the analysis Warner and Goldberg
reach two conclusions:
1. That the variation in ACOL explains much of the varia-
tion in the probability of reenlisting.
2. That the estimates for the coefficient for sea duty
varies with the extent of sea duty [Ref. 18, p. 32].
Additionally, the results showed that married individ-
uals reenlist at a higher rate than single persons. Also,
the variable accounting for civilian unemployment was only
positive and significant in about half of the estimated
eguations by specific occupation.
Finally, Warner and Goldberg suggest that sea duty
serves to shift the supply curve for Navy personnel as well
as alter its slope [Ref. 18, p. 33]. To test this, they
estimated a probit eguation across all of the personnel mak-
ing the reenlistment decision in FY-1979. The results indi-
cated that the sea duty variable has a highly significant
negative effect on first-term reenlistment rates [Ref. 18,
p. 33]. In conclusion, this study developed and estimated a
model for first-term reenlistment in the Navy. Its results
suggest that manpower planners should focus on the effect
that sea duty has on reenlistments
.
Lakhani and Gilroy [Ref. 19] attempt to isolate those
factors that determine the reenlistment/extension/
separation decision. Particular attention is paid to
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military pay, and the selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) of
specific military occupational specialties (MOS). In focus-
ing on compensation, Lakhani and Gilroy first develop a
civilian wage model to estimate the potential earnings of
personnel leaving the Army. This model uses variables simi-
lar to those used in previous studies; specifically, wage,
unemployment, education, experience, race, marital status,
and number of dependents. The data used in estimating the
model came from a 1981 National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS)
of Young Labor Market Experience [Ref. 19, p. 227]. Lakhani
and Gilroy failed to select a sex specific variable, and,
therefore, must implicitly assume that the wage earning pro-
files and reenlistment behavior of men and women are the
same. In studies by Weiss, Viscussi, and others, a reason-
able basis has been established to estimate separate models
of guit behavior based on sex. Therefore, eliminating this
sex variable may bias the sample due to the different cost
associated with leaving. Lakhani and Gilroy then use a log-
linear regression to estimate the coefficients for the
civilian wage model and use the results to predict the
implicit civilian wage first-term Army enlistees would face
[Ref. 19, p. 227]
.
The first-term enlistee also has three discrete choices
at the end of his first enlistment: (1) separate, (2) short
term commitment or extension, and (3) long term commitment.
Within this context Lakhani and Gilroy develop a model based
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on the theory of utility maximization [Ref. 19, p. 229],
Their utility model consisted of two parts: "(1) the sys-
temic or representative and deterministic part that can be
easily measured and (2) an unobserved random or stochastic
part [Ref. 19, p. 229]." Given this model, a rational ser-
vice member would choose the reenlistment option that
maximizes his utility.
The data for estimating the reenlistment model were
taken from the Army Enlisted Master File for FY-1980 and FY-
1981. The MOSs were grouped into 15 career management
fields (CMF), each group as homogeneous as possible. The
military wage an individual received was calculated as base
pay plus allowances for guarters, subsistence, and variable
housing. Unemployment rates were obtained from the Bureau
of Labor and Statistics (BLS) [Ref. 19, p. 232].
Lakhani and Gilroy proceed to estimate a multinomial
logit reenlistment/extension/separation eguation for each of
the 15 CMF's and a total among all CMF's. Among the results
it was found that the coefficient for SRB's was positive in
all eguations. The coefficient for wage was positive in all
but three of the CMF's. The coefficient for race was also
positive and significant in all 15 eguations with blacks
reenlisting at a greater rate than their white counterparts
[Ref. 19, p. 237]; indicating perhaps that there is less
discrimination and better opportunities for blacks in the
Army.
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The only results that Lakhani and Gilroy did not antici-
pate were for unemployment and AFQT scores. They explain
that the effect of unemployment is also captured by the
civilian wage variable, so that collinearity among these
variables may have masked the unemployment effect [Ref. 19,
p. 237]. In terms of the AFQT variable, they were unable to
explain the positive sign and were continuing work to cor-
rect or explain this counterintuitive result [Ref. 19, p.
240] .
Finally, retention was shown to depend on both regular
compensation and SRB's. Therefore, force managers can
manipulate bonuses and special pay so as to reduce payments
to those military occupations where civilian demand is less,
and increase it where demand is high. In conclusion,
Lakhani and Gilroy 's findings suggest that Army manpower
planners should rely more heavily on economic incentives to
obtain specific types of labor.
F. CONCLUSIONS
These readings on guit behavior focus on the application
of economic theory to particular sections of society based
on gender, specific firms, and military service. A major
difficulty encountered in the research was how to determine
which variables can best act as predictors of guit behavior.
The problem, along with a lack of available data which
measures performance, promotability , and other non-pecuniary
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variables, required researchers to use innovative modeling
techniques that best take into account non-pecuniary factors
through the use of proxy variables. Generally, the vari-
ables chosen to model quit behavior can be categorized into
one of the following groups: (1) pesonal characteristics,
(2) human capital factors, (3) job-specific variables, and
(4) non-pecuniary factors.
The studies which reviewed quit behavior as a function
of gender substantiate that different models for quits
should be estimated based on sex. Given this result, I have
chosen to estimate a model for male enlistees only.
The remainder of studies which involve quits in civilian
firms, early military attrition, and reenlistment behavior
all provide important insights, to which factors had pre-
viously been significant in determining quit behavior. The
economic theories used and models specified were well de-
fined and best estimates given the available data. These
studies, and the techniques utilized, are acknowledged as a
foundation for the variable selection and model
specification for this thesis.
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This section will discuss the selected sample's composi-
tion, and describe the underlying data set. Additionally,
it will describe the criteria for model selection along with
the estimation techniques used in the final model
specification.
A. DATA ORGANIZATION
The data used in this sample are extracted from the
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) cohort files and include
Marine Corps non-prior service males who enlisted between
September of 1980-1981 on a four year contract. These data
elements were obtained by matching the most recent informa-
tion from the Headquarters Marine Corps enlisted master file
(EMF), with the cohorts master or loss records, with the
most current record taking precedent.
Within this data set are Inter-Service Separation Codes,
which classify under what conditions an individual is
separated. These separations can be narrowed down into nine
general areas: (1) Release from service - end of contract,
early discharge program, (2) medical disqualifications, (3)
dependency or hardship, (4) death, (5) entry into officer
programs, (6) retirement, (7) failure to meet minimum
behavioral or performance criteria, (8) others, and (9)
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reenlistment . For this study I am interested only in those
individuals who voluntarily made the decision to quit the
military or reenlist. All other separations were those over
which the individual had little or nor control. Therefore,
under this criteria, only those in categories (1) and (9)
were selected for the sample.
Additionally, I selected only those in paygrades E-3
through E-6 . I imposed this condition because it would be
impossible for an individual to be a paygrade E-2 without
having received some type of disciplinary action in his
first term of service, thus his quit or stay decision would
become a function of command waivers for reenlistment, again
an condition over which the individual has little control.
After selecting the sample according to the criteria
above my data base consisted fo 12,801 cases. Among these
9,711 (75.9 percent) had made the decision to quit, and
3,090 (24.1 percent) to reenlist. It is important to note
that this data base accounts for only those who made an
immediate reenlistment decision on expiration of their
contract. Those who separate, but reenlist at some point in
the future are considered "quitters" in this study. Also, I
am aware that some individuals may wish to reenlist, but due
to MOS constraints imposed by Headquarters Marine Corps
requiring lateral moves may not do so. Additionally, con-
straints such as rank requirements, education level, or
commander's recommendation can effect the individual's
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leave/stay decision. These type of criteria are a result of
demand for the composition of the upper ranks of the en-
listed force. Given these demand side constraints exist, it
is possible that they may distort the true voluntary nature
under which the decision to leave or stay is based.
However, given available data it is not possible to isolate
such effects. Generally, the number of cases effected by
demand side constraints is considered to be small and
should, therefore, have no effect on my final model
specification
.
B. DATA ELEMENT DESCRIPTION
Within the data set there exists several categories that
variables may be grouped in. The areas are selected from
previous studies such as Solnick, [Ref. 9], Blandin [Ref.
12], and Chow and Polich [Ref. 17], and establish a basis
for variable selection in the model specification.
Specifically, for this study I have grouped them into three
categories: (1) personal characteristics, (2) human capital
factors, and (3) job specific factors. For a complete
listing see Table 1.
(1) Personal Characteristics - These variables include
marital status, number of dependents, race, and geo-
graphical region of enlistment. A set of eight dummy
variables indicate the region of enlistment. See
Table 1. East North Central is the omitted group.
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(2) Human Capital Factors - These include education
level, experience in a Junior Reserve Officer Train-
ing Corps or Sea Cadet program, Armed Forces Qualifi-
cation Test Group (AFQT) , and other specific section
of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
(ASVAB) . Education level included a set of three
dummy variables with high school graduates as the
omitted group. The AFQT group consisted of three
dummies, those in categories I through IIIB. The
omitted group was mental categories IVA, IVB, and V.
The AFQT score is a composite of three test sections
out of nine from the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude
Battery (ASVAB). (AFQT = Arithmetic Reasoning +
Verbal + Numeric Operations/2.) Other dummy vari-
ables created using the ASVAB score were general
science, word knowledge, math knowledge, mechanical
comprehension, and electronic information.
(3) Job Specific Factors - This set of variables set out
to capture the effects of paygrade, an initial
enlistment waiver, specific MOS groupings, timing of
entry, and promotions. The use of the waiver vari-
able is to determine, using two dummy variables,
first those who received waivers for "moral"
disqualifications, (i.e., excessive speeding tickets,
misdemeanor arrests, or experimental drug use) and,






2. Number of Dependents
3. Age at End of Contract
4. Black





7. Enlisted in West/North/Cent
8. Enlisted in South Atlantic
9. Enlisted in East/South/Cent
10. Enlisted in West/South/Cent
11. Enlisted in Mountain Region
12. Enlisted in Pacific Region
13. Enlisted in New England
1 = Married = Single
Continuous 0-6
Continuous Variable
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
Human Capital Factors
14. Non-High School Graduate
15. Some College Education
16. College Degree
17. Junior ROTC Experience
18. AFQT Group I
19. AFQT Group II
20. AFQT Group IIIA & IIIB
21. ASVAB General Science Score
22. ASVAB Word Knowledge Score
23. ASVAB Math Knowledge
24. ASVAB Mechanical Score
25. ASVAB Electronic Information
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =










29. Admin Support MOS
30. Intelligence MOS
31. Logistics MOS
32. Combat Support MOS
33. Elec. Equipment Repair MOS
34. Communications MOS
35. Aircraft Operations MOS
36. Aircraft & Ordnance MOS
37. Supply MOS
38. Mechanic MOS
39. Months in Delayed Entry
40. Summer Enlistee
41. Number of Promotions
Continuous E-3 - S-
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
1 = If applicable Else =
Continuous 0-12
1 = If applicable Else =
Continuous 2-5
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number of dependents, age, test score) effects on
quitting. The omitted group was those who did not
need waivers to enlist. Next, due to the large
number of MOSs, which even if broken down into DoD
occupational groups was to unwildy, it was necessary
to further generalize occupations using a common
sense grouping. In this effort, I classified indi-
viduals using the lowest common denominator as a
grouping criteria. For example, a Marine will be
classified as administrative support regardless if he
is a personnelman, record bookkeeper, or is an avia-
tion supply clerk. Therefore, when the majority of
an individual's work was in a specific area such as
administration, he was classified as such regardless
of the specifics of the unit in which he was
assigned. This approach is taken to capture the
specifics of job tasks an individual is involved in
performing without including the effects of unit
types. In this vein, 11 dummy variables were
created. (See Table 1.) The omitted group was
infantry. Additionally, two variables to reflect
timing were included, these were months in the
Delayed Entry Program and a summer enlistee (May-
August). Finally, given the results of a recent
Marine Corps Exit Survey which indicated promotions
or lack thereof as the number one reason for
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separation, I included a variable to capture this
effect. It was computed as the present paygrade
minus the entry paygrade.
C. THE MODEL
The basis on which the decision to leave or stay in the
military is made, is assumed to be one of utility
maximization. In my analysis I will apply the theory of
utility maximization as outlined in the literature review
and specifically use the model developed by Solnick [Ref. 9,
p. 5]. In this model, each of the three levels of-variables
(Personal Characteristics, Human Capital, and Job Specific
Factors) contain a vector of characteristics that represent
the particular attributes for each category.
In the most simple of these models a Marine at the reen-
listment point would compare the present value of his
expected lifetime utility with that of alternatives avail-
able to him. This model also takes into account any cost
that might be incurred by the Marine in quitting such as,
retraining an individual might need for a new job. The
model is specified as follows:
(1) 0=1 if V(Uj) > V(Uo) + C (Marine Quits)
Q = IF V(Uj) < V(Uo) + C (Marine Reenlists)
= Quit
V(Uj) = discounted expected utility of
alternative job j, j = l,...n
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V(Uo) = discounted expected utility to staying in
Marines
C = Cost of quitting
[Ref . 9, p. 5]
.
This model specification provides the initial basis on
which the decision to quit or stay occurs. However, it is
exceedingly difficult for one to measure a utility. Utility
is defined as "a number that represents the level of satis-
faction that a consumer derives from a particular market
basket" [Ref. 1, p. 15]. Given this definition, one also
realizes that different people place different values on
items in the market basket. As an example, a Marine with a
family may derive higher satisfaction from medical benefits
than someone who is single. This difficulty of measurement
occurs for a wide variety of items that may effect the quit
decision. Therefore, "since the expected utilities (and the
cost of quitting) are not directly observable, the empirical
model necessarily relies on proxy variables," [Ref. 9, p.
5] . Also, given that specific attributes can effect the
quit decision through both the expected utility of a
Marine's alternatives and that of reenlisting, the overall
effect of that attribute will depend on its relative size.
This relates to the question of how much satisfaction a
married Marine may derive from the health care system as
opposed to someone who is single. The overall measurement
of a particulat attribute Xi on V(Uj) and V(Uo) implies:
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Hi =^ -^ tRef. 9, p. 6J.
Given the development of the original model (1), a more
specific and usable model can be developed by applying the
following relationships:
(2) V(Uj) = f(Xi)
(3) V(Uo) = f(Xi, Wj)
(4) € = h(Z t , R, e) [Ref. 9, pp. 6-7].
Where
X^ = personal characteristics
Wj = job specific characteristics that affect
satisfaction and future promotion potential
Z t = variables reflecting family responsibilities
R = non-cash benefits (i.e., housing, health care,
life insurance) increase with longevity
e = personal risk preference (a normally and
independently distributed random variable
[Ref. 9, p. 7]
.
Given the symbols defined above the final empirical
model is obtained by substituting equations (2), (3), and
(4) into (1).
(5) Q = f(X if Wj, Z t , R, e) [Ref. 9, p. 10].
D. FUNCTIONAL FORM
Having expressed the fundamental model relationship
above, the next issue of concern is what functional form
should the model take on. The most widely used in the
literature are the linear function, logistic function, and
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probit. Each of these models attempt to predict a specific
dependent variable given one or more independent factors.
Each functional form has certain advantages and can be used
more accurately given a correct interpretation of the under-
lying relatioship between the dependent and independent
variables in the model.
Each of these functional forms are:
Linear: P = a+e^x 1 +
e




p = dependent variable
a = constant term
3K = coefficient of attribute XK
XK = explanatory variable
ei = error term





p = constrained dependent variable (0-1)
a = constant term
$K = coefficient of attribute XK
Xj< = explanatory variable
ei = error term
Probit: P = F( a+3 1X 1 +
3
2X 2 + . . .+
3
KXK = F(Zi))
p = constrained dependent variable (0-1)
F = cumulative normal probability distribution
a = constant term
3K = coefficient of attribute XK
Xj< = explanatory variable
Zi = an index determined by the explanatory
variables XK and the estimated parameters
a and 3K •
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The linear form is simplest, and easiest to interpret,
given that the estimated coefficients can be interpreted to
represent the increase in the probability of quitting when
the corresponding explanatory variable is present. However,
given that the dependent variable is in the interval from
to 1, there is a possibility that the use of the linear form
may result in predicted probabilities that fall outside this
range. "The obvious solution to the problem is to transform
the original model in such a way that the predictions will
lie in the (0,1) interval for all X" [Ref. 10, p. 280].
One possible solution is to use the logistic model which
is based on the cumulative logistic probability function.
The other is the use of the probit model which is associated
with the cumulative normal probability function. The major
difference between each model is, that the logit model is
fatter in the tails, and therefore yields different values
of the predicted probability value P(Z). Quite often the
logit and probit models can be run as substitutes for one
another. Therefore, my choice to use the probit method as
the desired functional form stems from (1) the need to
transform the dependent variable to the (0,1) interval, (2)
the probit form implies a signoid (s shaped) relationship
between the probabilities and characteristics, which better
approximates the relationship than does the linear form, and




In choosing the probit model I assume there exists an
index Z^ which is a linear function of the explanatory vari-
able Xi , (i.e., Z-[ = a + 0x^). Z^ can be thought of as a
tendency toward doing something, in this case quitting the
Marines. Note, one cannot observe Z^, one only observes
whether an individual will leave or stay. The problem still
is to obtain estimates of a and 3 and then of P, the proba-
bility of quitting. Therefore, I will assume that for each
Marine a value Z^* represents the critical cutoff value
which translates the underlying index into a quit/stay
decision. Z^* is assumed to have a cumulative normal
distribution.
Specifically: a Marine quits if Z^ > Z^*
a Marine stays if Z^ < z i*»
Under these assumptions, the probit method provides
consistent maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters a
and 3 .
E. DATA AND MODEL SUMMARY
In summary, I will apply Solnicks' model of utility max-
imization to the first term, non-prior service Marines'
decision to quit or stay in the military on completion of
his four year contract. The method of analysis and func-
tional form will be the probit model using the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSSX) . There will be 12
models estimated, one for the entire group, and then
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separate models based on race, marital status, education,
and finally, AFQT mental group.
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section will discuss and present the estimated
models for the entire population, as well as the selected
models based on marital status, race, education, and AFQT
grouping. Additionally, I will review differences and simi-
larities that exist in the parameter estimates between the
original model and the selected demographic models.
A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
The parameter estimates for the guit model are presented
in Table 2. They provide a general assessment of the impor-
tance of the factors that I have chosen. This model may be
used for a more specific purpose than just determining impor-
tance of factors that affect the guit decision.
Specifically, this model can be used to calculate the pre-
dicted guit rate for any given values of the independent
variables. These calculations can be used to measure to what
extent the guit rate of first term enlisted Marines could be
affected, if Headguarters Marine Corps, the Department of the
Navy (DoN) or other higher government agencies effected
policy changes that resulted in altering the values of the
factors included in the model. As one example, I can esti-
mate what the effect of increasing promotions, changing edu-
cation reguirements , or increasing compensation will have on
a Marine's decision to leave or stay.
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This model strongly suggests that there are eight factor
areas that have a significant effect on the decision to
quit. These are (1) marital status, (2) age, (3) race, (4)
non-high school graduates, (5) scores from word and math
knowledge sections of ASVAB, (6) job specific MOS , (7) pay-
grade and compensation, and (8) promotion.
First, the effect of being married on quits was rela-
tively large, negative, and significant at the above 5%
level. In the data set 37 percent were married. Given the
large demands the Marine Corps places on a young Marine's
time one might expect family pressures to lead to a higher
propensity to quit. What this model shows however, is that
being married acts as a stabilizer for first term Marines
and actually increases the probability the Marine will stay
in. The economics occurring here reflect that married
Marines have a higher cost of quitting than do singles due
to payment of subsistence and housing allowance to married
Marines. In fact, the basic Marine Corps policy is that
sinqle Marines will live in provided quarters (usually a
barracks with 2 to 3 man rooms) and take all meals in the
enlisted dining facility. This is a point of contention
among young single Marines who feel they would rather re-
ceive the cash benefit in order to provide the mix of goods
(housing and food) that maximize their individual utilities.
Additionally, married Marines receive a slightly higher
allowance for housing which is generally perceived as
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unfair. Therefore, referring back to the original model in
equation (1) , the married Marine has a higher cost associ-
ated with quitting and, therefore, is more likely to stay
in.
Second, the age of a Marine at the end of his contracted
enlistment had a negative and significant effect at the 5
percent level on quitting. This result is as anticipated,
given that the older the individual is on leaving the Marine
Corps the less time available to him to recoup the cost for
any training needed in the civilian labor market.
Additionally, being older at the end of a contract implies
the initial enlistment age of the individual was older, and
a possible reason to enlist was an inability to find
employment opportunity equal to what the Marine Corps
offered in the civilian labor marked. Therefore, one would
anticipate that those with previous bad experiences in find-
ing acceptable employment in the civilian labor market would
not be anxious to return.
Third, the effect of being black was relatively large,
negative, and significant at 5 percent, whereas being in the
other minority races has a smaller, negative effect, and is
also significant at 5 percent. This result is due to a per-
ceived equality of treatment of minorities within the Marine
Corps as opposed to opportunities availables to non-whites
in the civilian labor market. In as much that discrimina-
tion in the market place does occur it drives up the cost of
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TABLE 2
PROBIT ESTIMATES OF PARAMETERS OF QUIT MODEL
REGRESSION COEFFICIENT
N = 12,295 COEFFICIENT /S.E.
Marital Status -.47058 -12.28987**
Number of Dependents .01363 .59453
Age at End of Contract -.02007 -2.17490**
Black -.53093 -13.16660**






Mountain Region -.11608 -1.79709*
Pacific Region .08459 1.54762
New England .09714 1.57475
Non-High School Graduate .15522 1.81698*
Some College Education .06615 .95248
College Degree .53014 2.33858**
Junior ROTC Experience -.12655 -1.40445
General Science .01296 .53274
Word Knowledge -.08002 -3.32074**
Math Knowledge -.06680 -3.84026**
Mechanical Comp .02386 1.17820
Electronic Information .02748 1.58937
Paygrade -.43562 -13.47299**
Moral Waiver .08238 2.86636**
Other Waiver -.00688 -.09513
Admin Support MOS -1.03364 -14.96523**
Intelligence MOS -.63056 -4.59177**
Logistics MOS -.96314 -11.91096**
Combat Support MOS -.78571 -13.02834**
Elec. Equipment Repair MOS -.56020 -9.68342**
Communications MOS -.74065 -11.13811**
Aircraft Repair Ord. MOS -.83380 -13.90975**
Supply MOS -.81597 -11.01003**
Mechanic MOS -.86291 -13.01083**
Aircraft Operations MOS -.82661 -10.09061**
Months in Delayed Entry -.01361 -3.06636**
Summer Enlistee -.44861 -13.41405**







PEARSON GOODNESS OF FIT CHI SQUi
9.86578 38.42877
^RE=12413.225 DIn=12253 P=.153
*SIGNIFICANT AT 10 PERCENT.
**SIGNIFICANT AT 5 PERCENT.
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quitting for blacks, and other non-whites. This cause helps
explain the disproportionate number of blacks and non-whites
in the Marine Corps as a percentage of the population as a
whole. Additionally, non-pecuniary benefits received as one
proceeds through the rank structure, such as responsibility,
respect and authority, historically will be much higher for
non-whites in the Marine Corps than in the civilian labor
market. This effect will cause a higher discounting of
alternatives available and results in blacks and other non-
whites displaying higher propensity to remain in the Corps
than whites.
Fourth, the effect of education on quits is broken down
into those without high school degrees and those with some
college. No high school degree had a positive effect on
quits and was significant at 10 percent. This result is sup-
ported by Blandin [Ref. 12], Boesel and Johnson [Ref. 13],
Buddin [Ref. 11] and others, and indicates that those with-
out a degree lack the stick-to-it attitude of their graduate
counterparts. Those who had some college had a small posi-
tive effect on quits but it was insignificant. Those who
received college degrees had a large positive effect on
quits and was significant at the 5 percent level. This
result is as expected since with a large investment in human
capital these individuals expect a high wage in the civilian
labor market. Interestingly, the Marine Corps offers a
tuition assistance program to enlisted members and
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encourages them to gain as much college experience as pos-
sible in their time off. The idea is that this process will
result in a better qualified, more productive Marine. Given
the results of this model, it appears that what actually
occurs is a greater likelihood of quitting. Therefore, in
the shadow of tightening defense budgets the Marine Corps
should review this program for cost effectiveness to see if
the productivity increase is large enough to offset the
future loss of that Marine. Intuitively, I think not given
that the additional education is general and where young
Marines are weakest is their job specific skills.
Fifth are the effects of an individual's score on the
word knowledge and math knowledge sections of the ASVAB.
Each of these factors are negative and significant at the 5
percent level, contrary to expectation. Interestingly, the
ASVAB uses as a measure of "Academic Ability," the sections
Word Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, and Arithmetic
Reasoning. Additionally, verbal skills are measured with
the use of word knowledge. Math knowledge is used to mea-
sure one's ability to apply mathematical principles and
arithmetic skills to problem solving. These measures,
therefore, reflect previous investments in human capital,
specifically education an individual has attained.
Therefore, if given two individuals both with high school
degrees and equal in all other apsects, I would anticipate
the one with the higher scores to be more likely to quit at
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the end of his enlistment. This result would follow from
human capital theory since the individual with more ability
would perceive more alternatives of greater value in the
market place and, therefore, have a higher propensity to
quit.
Sixth, the ten variables representing job specific fac-
tors revealed in all cases a large, negative, and signifi-
cant effect on quits at the 5 percent level. The omitted
segment in the model were those in the infantry MOS . This
result indicates that those who serve in non-infantry
billets are much more satisfied with their job. In line
with job-matching/job satisfaction theory, I would then
expect that those Marines in other than infantry jobs would
associate a higher loss of utility and greater cost to quit
than would an infantryman. There are primarily two reasons
for these results, first for those serving in an infantry
job in their first enlistment the job is physically
demanding, consumes large amounts of what would otherwise be
leisure time on field exercises and deployments, and
generally is perceived to be the lowest on an ad hoc scale
of desirability. Hence, the Infantry are referred to as
"grunts." Second, while these "grunts" do receive extensive
training in tactics, small arms marksmanship, land
navigation, and many areas of a combat origin, they are all
specific skills with little transferrability to the civilian
labor market. One might expect this job specific skill
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would keep the infantryman in the Marines more so than the
other MOSs. However, recall that a specific attribute such
as MOS can effect the quit decision through both the
expected utility of a Marine's alternatives and that of re-
enlisting, and the overall effect of that attribute will
depend on its relative size.
... ,, aouit av(u-j) av(u^)Specifically:
-rfcr = aMAg J - aMno Q3M0Si SMOSi 3 0S 1
In the case of an infantryman the effect of the possible
alternatives V(Uj) for a specific MOS for individual i are
greater than the utility received if the Marine reenlists
V(U ) . Therefore, the amount of dissatisfation that occurs
for this individual overwhelms the benefit received for re-
enlisting and applying the job specific skills learned.
In line with human capital theory and job-specific
versus general skills, it can be seen that those in the more
technical MOSs, for example, the electrical equipment
repair, have the highest propensity to quit. While this
results is not startling it certainly indicates that the
Marine Corps is losing those individuals it needs most
desparately, its infantrymen and skilled technicians. As a
result the Marine Corps experiences job crowding in the MOSs
with the lowest propensity to quit, in this model it indi-
cates those in the administrative support field, which
certainly reflects the current situation.
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Seventh, are the effects of paygrade on quits which is
negative and significant at the 5 percent level. This fac-
tor represents compensation, and as such may inculcate cer-
tain weaknesses of individuals to underestimate the true
value of their total income. As an example, tax advantages,
medical benefits, housing, and subsistence. However, I
assume that if this weakness exists, that it is the same
among all in the sample and, therefore, should not result in
a biased factor. This result is supported by Chow and
Polich [Ref. 17] who found that "when sample members came to
the point where they had to decide on reenlistment , they
behaved as though their actual levels of compensation, and
not their perceptions, were the principal factor in the
decision" [Ref. 17, p. 36]. Therefore, the more pay
received the less likely a Marine would be to quit. This is
in line with the original model, where the Marine who is
payed more has a higher cost of quitting.
Finally, the promote factor is significant at the 5 per-
cent level and has a positive effect on quitting. This re-
sult poses an interesting question, in that the number one
reason for separation found in the 1986 exit survey of
Marine Corps enlisted personnel was lack of promotion.
Therefore, one might hypothesize that to reduce quits, a
balancing out of promotion rates between occupational
specialties is needed. This change may reduce guits
overall, but result in a higher quit rate among the best
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qualified Marines who would perceive less promotion oppor-
tunity and rewards for their greater innate abilities. I
believe that my model as specified shows the correct results
of promotions on quitting, since those who are promoted most
quickly are ambitious, dedicated individuals with larger
investments in personal human capital. The exit survey on
the other hand is simply a tabulation of responses from
those offered and suggest no statistical association between
the intended behavior of a particular group and the
responses given. In essence, it appears to be a "sour
grapes" type attitude and reveals only something about the
quit population from which the sample is taken. I would
expect that those who are promoted most frequently would
derive a higher utility from these alternatives than remain-
ing in the Marines. As an example it is possible for an
individual to be meritoriously promoted to Sergeant within
three years of enlistment. Then by spending two consecutive
tours on the "drill field" (recruit training depot) can be
promoted to Gunnery Sergeant. The alternatives available to
this individual along with the general training in manage-
ment skills would raise the likelihood of a quit.
The Marine Corps, and armed services in general, try to
counter this result through the retirement and benefits
associated with twenty years of service. But as evidenced
in this model, the erosion of the benefits, which in the
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past has raised the cost of quitting, will become much less
important and result in a higher quit rate.
Another interesting result from this model, was that
those who spent a longer time in the Delayed Entry Program
pool, had a negative and significant effect on quits. This
relates to the individual most probably receiving a good job
match into the MOS he desired, justifying a long wait.
Also, a timing issue, were those who were summer enlistees,
show a significant and negative effect on quits. This
reflects that those entering at this time are the high-
school graduates who are most likely to remain in the Marine
Corps. While those who enlist during other times in the
year do so more out of an inability to get or keep another
job and thus are classified as "labor market lemons".
B. PREDICTIVE MODEL SELECTING ON MARITAL STATUS
The parameter estimates for the quit models selecting on
married and single personnel can be seen in Table 3. The
basic assumption is that given the same model married
Marines will behave differently than their single
counterparts. The parameter estimates assess the effect of
factors on quit behavior, and in what direction (positive or
negative), will being married tend to move, more toward
staying or leaving the Marine Corps.
The first difference between the models can be seen in
the end age factor. This variable is very small (.01) for
90
married Marines, and is not significnt. However, the same
variable has a negative and significant effect at the 5 per-
cent level on singles guit behavior. While in the general
population model we see that singles are more likely to
guit, this further shows that the younger a single Marine is
the more likely he is to guit. This reflects the low quit-
ting cost against him and the availability to still further
invest in other human capital activities with enough time to
recoup that investment.
The race factor is not significant in either the married
or single population models. This result is not as expected.
Since in the original model race was significant at the 5
percent level and negative. Therefore, in the models
selecting on marital status, the race effect on guit be-
havior cannot be determined.
The variables that try to capture the effect of region
of enlistment on guits were insignificant in the general
population model. These factors attempt to measure if cer-
tain regions turn out Marines who have a greater propensity
to quit. The first time this factor does become significant
is for singles from the Mountain region. The effect on
guits is negative and significant at the 5 percent level.
Interestingly, the variables for the Pacific and New England
regions are positive for both singles and married.
The parameter estimates for these two variables are not
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significant but pose an interesting area for further re-
search on regional factors affecting guits.
The education factor results showed that for both single
and married Marines there was a positive effect on guits for
non-high school graduates and those with college education.
Again, those who had received a college degree had a much
higher propensity to guit than those with only some college.
The variables reflecting academic ability from the ASVAB
being word and math knowledge was negative, small, and
significant at the 5 percent level for both groups. This
factor is similar to the results found in the general model
(Table 2) with the parameter estimates being very similar.
This consistency implies that these sections from the ASVAB
are good estimators of guit probability. Another consistent
estimator of guit probability between models is paygrade,
which is negative and significant and has almost identical
effects on the guit decision regardless of marital status.
Given the increase in the number of waivers being given
on enlistment, I tried to establish if any significant
differences exist between those who guit or stay based on
the type of waiver granted. Principally, waivers are given
for moral reasons (excessive speeding tickets, misdemeanor
arrests, or experimental drug use) or other reasons (number
of dependents, age, test score). Implicitly, I assume that
since those in the group who receive waivers have greater
difficulty entering the Marines they are less likely to guit
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TABLE 3
PROBIT ESTIMATES BY MARITAL STATUS
Number of Dependents
Age at End of Contract
Black
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INTERCEPT INTERCEPT/SE INTERCEPT INTERCEPT/SE
8.19708 21.33059 9.94037 29.76737
CHI SQUARE = 4235.775 DF = 4178 P = .262
CHI SQUARE = 8250.836 DF = 8035 P = .045
SIGNIFICANT AT 10 PERCENT
**SIGNIFICANT AT 5 PERCENT.
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at the end of their enlistment. Additionally, the number of
alternatives - V(Uj) - available are less given they have
existing conditions that limit their employment
opportunities. However, the results indicate just the
opposite, for those married there is a positive and signifi-
cant effect at the 5 percent level, and for single Marines
there is a positive effect on guits although significant
only at about the 15 percent level. What these results
imply is that those who enter under waivers are more likely
to guit than their non-waiver counterpart. The economic
explanation to this phenomenon may lie in the fact that
those who receive waivers are "labor market lemons" and as
such perform poorly in their regular duties. Given this
they perceive less alternatives and promotions are available
to them if they remain in the Marines and, therefore, heavi-
ly discount any benefits. Hence, a lower cost of guitting
and at least some limited alternatives would lead to the
decision to guit.
For both single and married Marines the variables which
model job-specifics (MOS) are negative and significant. The
omitted group infantry is revealing itself as a strong indi-
cator of a Marine's future intention to remain. All MOSs
have a much higher propensity to guit regardless if the
individual is single or married. In both models Administra-
tive Support MOSs have the largest negative effects on guits
and Electronic Eguipment Repair the smallest. These
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results support the findings for the general population
model in Table 2.
The factors associated with time of entry, indicate that
the longer one remained in the Delayed Entry Pool and those
who enlisted in the summer were less likely to guit. This
result was the same for married and single Marines.
The promotion factor had a positive effect on guits, and
was significant at the 5 percent level. Note, however, that
the effect was almost twice as large for married Marines.
Given the same alternatives, I would anticipate that a
married Marine would have higher guitting cost and thus be
the group less likely to guit given the same number of
promotions. An explanation may lie in the fact that married
Marines' wives often forfeit income due to freguent moving.
Therefore, given the husband has a more stable alternative
it could increase his wife's earning potential and increase
the likelihood of guitting.
Finally, the factors which model mental ability, (AFQT)
indicate a small negative effect on guits for all groups.
These factors are not significant in any model. While
traditionally in the literature this variable is a good
estimator of guit behavior, in this case it turns out not to
be so. Actually, the math and word knowledge sections of
the ASVAB do a better job at modelling mental ability than
the composites which make up the AFQT score.
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The ability of the models to correctly predict quits
selecting on marital status were:
Married - 84.8 percent correct
Single — 94.2 percent correct.
C. PREDICTIVE MODEL SELECTING ON RACE
The parameter estimates for the quit models selecting on
blacks or whites can be seen in Table 4. Given the strong
significance of the race factor in the general model, I
would expect that blacks will be less likely to quit,
ceteris paribus . The parameter estimates indicate differ--
ences between blacks and whites in the importance of the
other factors that affect quitting.
The models indicate that being married has a significant
and negative effect on quitting. This is in line with the
general model. Having hypothesized that discrimination in
the market place raises the cost of quitting for blacks, I
would anticipate that being a married black would raise the
cost to quit even more. Therefore, in the model selecting
on blacks, I have anticipated a much larger negative effect
on quits for blacks than whites (given both models are
identically specified). This result indicates that social
values about marriage within the black community may effect
the quit decision differently than whites. However, this
thesis lacks sufficient data to investigate this issue and
further research is needed.
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TABLE 4
PROBIT ESTIMATES BY RACE
WHITES (N = 10,084) BLACKS (N
Married
REGRES COEFF COEFF/S.E. REGRES COEFF COEFF/S.E.
-.50058 -11.70775** -.37138 -3.70136**
Number of Dependents .01946 .75092 .00386 .06590
Age at End of Contract -.00666 -.63469 -.07394 -3.18814**
Mid-Atlantic .04423 .96090 -.12269 -1.18499
West/North/Central -.00468 -.08687 -.08718 -.44469
South-Atlantic -.03187 -.66940 -.17450 -1.83270*
East/South/Central .02112 .28629 -.13659 -.98310
West/South/Central -.05652 -.89084 .08334 .51294
Mountain Region -.12648 -1.88703* -.14354 -.22037
Pacific Region .11695 1.89655* .07412 .36988
New England .09037 1.38733 .13469 .60701
Non-High School Grad .18048 1.93523* .03262 .11241
Some College Education .00718 .09288 .31744 1.66118
College Degree .08689 .30470 1.53278 3.59656**
Junior ROTC Experience -.17274 -1.61724 .05253 .29444
General Science .01355 .49032 -.02178 -.36644
Word Knowledge -.08966 -3.30441** -.05231 -.84502
Math Knowledge -.06770 -3.46090** -.09683 -2.19491**
Mechanical Comp .04699 2.05961** -.05315 -1.04427
Electronic Information .00694 .35398 .12896 2.94391**
Paygrade -.34949 -9.64893** -.72604 -9.05699**
Moral Waiver .07657 2.42328** .03705 .44646**
Other Waiver .01702 .19246 -.10054 -.64814
Admin Support MOS -1.00197 -12.88158** -1.13936 -6.38263**
Intelligence MOS -.55822 -3.89915** -.80251 -1.33715
Logistics MOS -.94821 -10.68500** -.98519 -4.35261**
Combat Support MOS -.74002 -11.24016** -.98829 -5.86154**
Elec. Equip. Repair MOS -.51553 -8.20649** -.69259 -4.16718**
Communications MOS -.65650 -8.77333** -.99304 -5.85107**
Aircraft Rep Ord . MOS -.77021 -11.84469** -.99227 -5.64753**
Supply MOS -.70584 -8.10138** -1.07150 -6.11131**
Mechanic MOS -.74237 -10.03523** -1.22767 -6.91516**
Aircraft Ops MOS -.77018 -8.68738** -1.05276 -4.12231**
Months in Delayed Entry -.01456 -2.91899** -.01229 -1.08596
Summer Enlistee -.42335 -11.34969** -.62176 -6.97377**
Number of Promotions .18257 2.95938** .43327 2.49805**
AFQTGI -.13949 -2.22902 .68365 1.17836
APQTGII -.08181 -1.02139 .03777 .25092
AFQTGI I
I
-.08884 -1.21371 -.05896 -.58073
INTERCEPT INTERCEPT/SE INTERCEPT INTERCEPT/SE
9.27309 31.88321 11.67966 18.53763
WHITES
PEARSON GOODNESS-OF-FIT CHI SQUARE = 10i 35.152 DF = 10044 P = .358
BLACKS
PEARSON GOODNESS-OF-FIT CHI SQUARE = 1723.441 • DF = 1652 P = .108
SIGNIFICANT AT 10 PERCENT
**SIGNIFICANT AT 5 PERCENT.
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The factor that captures age has a negative and signifi-
cant effect for the blacks. This result supports the hypo-
thesis that older blacks face a higher cost of quitting than
do their younger counterparts, which is a function of their
ability to recoup any investments in human capital needed
for an alternative job. In the model selecting on whites
this value is almost zero and not significant.
The regional variables which heretofore have been dif-
ficult to interpret present some significant parameter
estimates. Considering that there exists geographic concen-
trations of individuals of different races I anticipated
that certain regions (for example, the South Atlantic for
blacks) would provide significant information on the pro-
pensity to quit for Marines who enlist from these areas.
Interestingly, being black and from the South Atlantic
region had a significant and negative effect on quits at the
10 percent level. The other regions did not have a signifi-
cant effect on the quit decision for blacks. The South
Atlantic regional factor does indicate that regions in which
black Marines are recruited from can be analyzed to deter-
mine future quit probabilities, and allow recruiting efforts
to be focused in regions that result in the desired force
structure requirements of the future. In the model for
whites the regions of the Pacific and New England also had a
positive effect on quits and in this model, Pacific region
was significant at the 10 percent level. Additionally,
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Blandin's [Ref. 12, pp. 12-13] parameter estimates for early
attrition indicate that the Pacific and New England region
had positive effects on early separation. This indicates
that individuals recruited from these two regions have a
higher propensity to leave the Marines.
The education factor again shows consistent results for
both blacks and whites, where those without high school
degrees or some college are more likely to quit than high
school graduates.
Once again, in both models ^selecting on blacks and
whites, the results indicate that the word and math know-
ledge sections of the ASVAB are significant and have a nega-
tive effect on guits. The parameter estimates for both
models are similar to those in the general model and further
support these factors' importance in determining quits.
The variable reflecting compensation (paygrade) is nega-
tive and significant at the 5 percent level in both models.
The parameters indicate blacks are about twice as sensitive
to changes in pay as whites; thus, a pay change would have a
greater impact on their decision to quit.
A unique result for the parameter estimates of specific
MOS effects on quits indicate that for blacks there exists a
negative and significant effect on quits. In previous
models being in the administrative support MOS had the
largest negative effects on quits. For the model selecting
on blacks it becomes mechanics .(-1.22). This result
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indicates that blacks in all other MOSs are more likely to
stay than the omitted group infantry. However, through
personal observation a large proportion of blacks serve in
the infantry and combat support MOSs than in the more tech-
nical fields. This suggests that blacks who are in these
more technical fields perceive a greater opportunity exists
for them in their specialized MOS than may exist in the
infantry, which I certainly believe is true due to the over-
crowding in the higher combat MOS ranks. In the model for
whites the parameter estimates for specific MOSs were more
in line with those of the general model. Also, in both race
groups the electric eguipment repair MOS had the smallest
negative effects on guits, again indicating that MOS as
being the next most likely to guit after infantry.
The factors that measured timing of entry, months in
DEP, and summer enlistees were significant and negative in
both race models. Again, the results were similar to the
general model.
Finally, the promotion factor had a positive and signi-
ficant effect on guits in both race models. In the model
for blacks the parameter estimate of .43 indicates greater
ability and more alternatives available and, thus, a greater
propensity to guit. In the model for whites the estimate
was half that for the black model which may indicate a
shortage of highly capable blacks in the market place.
Therefore, those black. Marines who distinguish
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themselves are given a wider range and better alternatives
from which to choose.
The ability of the race models to correctly predict
quits was:
White Model: 85.7 percent correct
Black Model: 67.9 percent correct.
D. PREDICTIVE MODEL SELECTION ON EDUCATION
The parameter estimates for the quit models selecting on
non-high school graduates, high school graduates, and those
with college education can be found in Tables 5-7.
1. Non-High School Graduates (Table 5)
The factors which model the personal characteristics
reflect the same results found in the previous models.
Specifically, being a married, older, minority non-graduate
has a negative effect on quits. Certainly, the cost of
quitting would be high to these individuals given a lack of
alternatives and limited educational skills.
The factors which reflect regional differences in pro-
pensity to quit were all insignificant. Although not signi-
ficant, the New England and Pacific regions had a positive
effect on quits. This result may be influenced by social
norms in these regions which place lower value on service to
country ethics. However, more data are needed to provide
characteristics of intention to remain in the Marines, given
specific regional values, to substantiate this theory.
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TABLE 5
PROBIT ESTIMATES OF PARAMETERS FOR NON-HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
REGRESSION COEFFICIENT
(N = 402) COEFFICIENT /S.E.
Marital Status -.57309 -2.07482**
Number of Dependents .21057 1.32475
Age at End of Contract -.10254 -1.88689*
Mid-Atlantic .34731 .97935
Black -.92084 -2.48863**





Mountain Region -.46033 -1.34071
Pacific Region .23175 .63308
New England 2.52415 .75401
Junior ROTC Experience -.41054 -.67177
General Science .09758 .53098
Word Knowledge -.02698 -.15442
Math Knowledge .08358 .61105
Mechanical Comp .16070 1.16972
Electronic Information -.24727 -1.77048
Paygrade -.93541 -3.40594**
Moral Waiver .03388 .15607
Other Waiver .07815 .16532
Admin Support MOS -.08580 -.12287
Intelligence MOS -2.03673 -1.93020*
Logistics MOS -.80754 -1.14018
Combat Support MOS -.86641 -1.72592
Elec. Eguip. Repair MOS -.68351 -1.45024
Communications MOS -1.69822 -3.15769**
Aircraft Repair Ord . MOS -.98692 -1.89943*
Supply MOS -.70773 -1.28703
Mechanic MOS -.87428 -1.55340
Aircraft Operations MOS -1.90009 -2.40388**
Months in Delayed Entry .00383 .08506
Summer Enlistee -.36349 1.63872*





PEARSON GOODNESS OF FIT CHI SQUi
13.93385 7.50360
^RE=399.555 I)F= 363 P=.090
SIGNIFICANT AT 10 PERCENT.
SIGNIFICANT AT 5 PERCENT.
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In trying to model the human capital factors effect on
quits, it has been shown that word and math knowledge have
provided significant parameter estimates with consistent
results. The other factors which attempt to capture the
effect of academic ability (AFQT group) were not
significant
.
Another result in this model was that 11 of the MOS
variables had a negative effect on quits but only four were
significant. Those in the intelligence field had the larg-
est negative parameter estimate, which previously had been
administrative support. Consistent with previous model
parameter estimates those in the electronic equipment repair
MOS had the smallest negative effect on quits.
The timing factors which looked at time in the Delayed
Entry Pool was virtually zero, and summer enlistees had a
negative effect on quits. Additionally, promotions had a
positive effect on quits as anticipated.
Consistent with the original model the parameter esti-
mates for both paygrade and blacks were negative and signi-
ficant at the 5 percent level.
This model predicted correctly 92.8 percent of all
those non-high school graduates who quit.
2. High School Graduates (Table 6)
Given the largest proportion of the sample population
is composed of high school graduates I anticipated that
these results would be similar to the general model Table 2.
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TABLE 6
PROBIT ESTIMATE OF PARAMETERS FOR HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
REGRESSION COEFFICIENT
(N = 11,329) COEFFICIENT /S.E.
Marital Status -.48151 -12.07261**
Number of Dependents .01115 .46437
Age at End of Contract -.02053 -2.07068**
Mid-Atlantic .01834 .42716
Black -.55352 -13.25401**





Mountain Region -.08178 -1.20574
Pacific Region .07113 1.24794
New England .09755 1.52791
Junior ROTC Experience -.13813 -1.45735
General Science .01094 .43386
Word Knowledge -.08024 -3.20952**
Math Knowledge -.07485 -4.16723**
Mechanical Comp .01976 .93933
Electronic Information .02894 1.61412
Paygrade -.44919 -13.14121**
Moral Waiver .07594 2.54719**
Other Waiver -.00791 -.10409
Admin Support MOS -1.02171 -14.07016**
Intelligence MOS -.64825 -4.38074**
Logistics MOS -.96425 -11.41223**
Combat Support MOS -.78210 -12.50302**
Elec. Equip. Repair MOS -.54957 -9.13934**
Communications MOS -.70830 -10.29225**
Aircraft Repair Ord . MOS -.83216 -13.39326**
Supply MOS -.79992 -10.41923**
Mechanic MOS -.85107 -12.43904**
Aircraft Operations MOS -.79225 -9.25970**
Months in Delayed Entry -.01319 -2.90251**
Summer Enlistee -.47330 -13.36855**







PEARSON GOODNESS OF FIT CHI SQU7
13.93385 7.50360
^RE=399.555 DE'= 363 P=.090
*SIGNIFICANT AT 10 PERCENT.
**SIGNIFICANT AT 5 PERCENT.
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This was the case as can be seen by comparing the parameter
estimates for Table 2 and Table 6.
For the personal characteristics factors it is seen
that being married, older, and a minority all have a signi-
ficant negative effect on guits. Again, in this model the
regional factors of Pacific and New England have a consis-
tent positive parameter estimate, though not significant at
the 10 percent level. The factors which estimated human
capital investment, and specifically academic ability, all
have negative parameter estimates for their effects on
guits, but were not significant, showing that high school
graduates regardless of mental group behave similarly.
Finally, the job specific factors were all negative
and significant at the 5 percent level with the administra-
tive support MOS having the largest negative effect on
guits, and electronic eguipment repairman the smallest.
Again, the timing of entry variable responded with negative
estimates for reasons explained in the general model.
Receipt of promotions had a positive effect on guits, as
anticipated.
This model correctly predicted 90.7 percent of all
high school graduates who guit.
3. Some College Education (Table 7)
This sub-sample of the population represents those who
have taken time to invest more in human capital than
their counterparts. Generally, the Marine Corps encourages
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education but provides little incentive for an enlistee,
particularly in his first term, to obtain a college
education. Specifically, these are no pay benefits, or
opportunities for early promotion based solely on education.
Therefore, those individuals who obtain college credit or
degrees during their first enlistment are assumed to have an
alternative agenda of entering an officer's commission
program, or leaving the Marine Corps at the end of their
contract
.
Having described the characteristics of this group as
one with a higher propensity to quit I would anticipate
smaller negative parameter estimates on those factors that
model personal characteristics and large negative parameter
estimates for specific MOS's, since the omitted group is
infantry, which has been shown to be the group with the
largest propensity to quit. Therefore, given an infantryman
with a college education as compared to any other job, his
likelihood of leaving at the end of his contract is very
high, as has been my general observation.
In the general model (Table 2), the parameter esti-
mates show that being married or in a minority group has a
negative effect on quits, but here they are not significant.
However, those who are older at the termination of their
contract are more likely to quit, although this effect is
not significant. In this group, this result is anticipated
since they would desire to recoup their human capital
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TABLE 7
PROBIT ESTIMATES OF PARAMETERS FOR THOSE WITH SOME
COLLEGE EDUCATION OR COLLEGE DEGREES
REGRESSION COEFFICIENT
N = 564 COEFFICIENT /S.E.
Marital Status -.29259 -1.57222
Number of Dependents .21057 -.11831
Age at End of Contract .00713 .25164
Mid-Atlantic .03526 .16664
Black -.06210 -.32519





Mountain Region -.49228 -1.47433
Pacific Region .21682 .81406
New England -.21484 -.73036
Junior ROTC Experience .19997 .53668
General Science .00988 .07653
Word Knowledge -.02508 -.19734
Math Knowledge .01754 .18586
Mechanical Comp -.03111 -.30314
Electronic Information .16541 1.87082*
Paygrade -.18734 -1.47259
Moral Waiver .23194 1.63116
Other Waiver .02672 .08598
Admin Support MOS -1.34572 -4.97119**
Intelligence MOS -.52847 -1.19895
Logistics MOS -1.08003 -3.26074**
Combat Support MOS -.85795 -3.00939**
Elec. Eguip. Repair MOS -.65440 -2.46495**
Communications MOS -1.00866 -2.98833**
Aircraft Repair Ord. MOS -.72099 -2.56258**
Supply MOS -1.38823 -3.23808**
Mechanic MOS -1.34475 -3.56272**
Aircraft Operations MOS -1.19431 -3.62660**
Months in Delayed Entry .00504 .15078
Summer Enlistee -.19229 -1.36065







PEARSON GOODNESS-OF-FIT CHI SQUAI
10.84473 1.04485
*E=542.067 DE'= 525 P=.294
*SIGNIFICANT AT 10 PERCENT.
**SIGNIFICANT AT 5 PERCENT.
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investment soon, given they are older and have a shorter
period over which to collect on their investment.
The factors which model human capital investment
reacted similar to those in the non-high school graduate
model. The key being that the math knowledge variable sign
changed from negative to a positive effect on quitting.
Given that mathematical skills and problem solving ability
are more marketable than liberal arts type education, this
result is not surprising. Again, AFQT group showed little
variation between category I to III, with Category III hav-
ing the smallest negative effect.
Finally, being a summer enlistee had a small negative
effect on quits, and time spent in the delayed entry pool
had no effect on the quit decision. The promotion factor
also had no effect on quits.
This model correctly predicted 83.8 percent of all
college graduates who quit.
E. PREDICTIVE MODEL SELECTING ON AFQT-GROUP
In examining the results for the entire sample, model
and subsamples selected on specific characteristics, it was
shown that being in AFQT group I-IIIB had a significant
effect on quits. The expectation existed that those in the
highest mental category would be the most likely to quit.
This was not always the case. Given this counterintuitive
result the following models were analyzed selectring on each
specific AFQT category.
108
1. AFQT Group I (Table 8)
The personal characteristic factors had a consistent
negative effect on quits, given the individual is married.
For this group the effect of marital status was nearly twice
as large as that for the whole sample, Table 2. This result
is significant in that it suggests significantly higher
quitting costs for married Marines in mental group I. This
might indicate a need for a policy shift in the Marine
Corps, first to increase the welfare of the Marine family
- thereby maintaining high quality Marines, and second,
closing the compensation differential between single and
married Marines. This policy shift would help to reduce the
effect of marital status on the quit decision.
In this model for the first time the race variable for
blacks is insignificant perhaps as a result of small sample
size. However, the parameter estimate is negative and
consistent with other models.
The education variables revealed negative parameter
estimates for non-high school graduates, and those with some
college, but were not significant. This negative effect on
quits may be a result of credentialism in our socity. Even
though these individuals are in the highest mental category,
without the degree the available alternatives are limited.
Other factors of interest in this model were the
effects of paygrade and having a waiver. First, the pay-
grade variable has revealed a consistently negative and
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TABLE 8
PROBIT ESTIMATES OF PARAMETERS FOR THOSE IN AFQT GROUP I
REGRESSION COEFFICIENT
(N = 387) COEFFICIENT /S.E.
Marital Status -.79648 -3.07598**
Number of Dependents .15000 .90009
Age at End of Contract .03088 .70435
Mid-Atlantic .12016 .47654
Black -.01463 -.02290





Mountain Region -.54692 -1.42390
Pacific Region .01969 .06586
New England -.35940 -1 .05252
Non-High School Graduate -.41892 -.82260
Some College Education -.03329 -.13194
College Education .07182 .10011
Junior ROTC Experience .25789 .48430
General Science -.36798 -2.10126**
Word Knowledge .08048 .52615
Math Knowledge -.21411 -1.25962
Mechanical Comp .15871 1.07979
Electronic Information .17222 1.29435
Paygrade -.49327 -2.45876**
Moral Waiver .22404 1.24025
Other Waiver -.99614 1.44082
Admin Support MOS -.88613 -2.11507**
Intelligence MOS -.28352 -.58987
Logistics MOS -1.71929 -4.19644**
Combat Support MOS -1.20042 -3.23431**
Elec. Eguip. Repair MOS -.67761 -2.29348**
Communications MOS -1.26888 -3.16820**
Aircraft Repair Ord . MOS -.35442 -1.00699
Supply MOS -1.19422 -2.42857**
Mechanic MOS -.81805 -1.44058
Aircraft Operations MOS -1.05810 -2.99743**
Months in Delayed Entry -.04867 -1.64858
Summer Enlistee -.50515 -2.57321**
Number of Promotions .08218 .30405
INTERCEPT INTERCEPT/SE
PEARSON GOODNESS OF FIT CHI SQUl
9.92581 6.15087
VRE=356.800 DF= 348 P=.361
*SIGNIFICANT AT 10 PERCENT.
**SIGNIFICANT AT 5 PERCENT.
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significant effect on quits. Therefore, this factor is well
established as a determinent of quit behavior. Second, the
variables which take into account those granted waivers were
positive but significant only at about the 20 percent level.
Those who received waivers for other than disciplinary
reasons had a negative effects on quits. This result though
suspect due to its significance level may indicate that
granting waivers to high mental group enlistees may not be a
"good bet" in the long run, since the problems they had on
entry may only become worse, encouraging a positive quit
decision.
Finally, those factors which modeled job specific
MOSs, time of entrance into the Marines, and promotions,
resulted in similar effects on quits as explained in pre-
vious models. This model correctly predicted 82.8 precent
of those who quit in mental group I.
2. AFQT Group II (Table 9)
Those in mental category II display results similar to
the general population Table 2 and those in category III
Table 10. It appears through examination of the parameter
estimates that more factors become significant and negative
in the change from category I to II and below.
In this model the personal characteristic variables,
for marital status and race, result in significant and nega-
tive estimates, consistent with the general population. The
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TABLE 9
PROBIT ESTIMATES OF PARAMETERS FOR AFQT GROUP II
REGRESSION COEFFICIENT
N = 4,482 COEFFICIENT /S.E.
Marital Status -.53249 -8.27653**
Number of Dependents .04561 1.15290
Age at End of Contract .02606 -1.76536
Mid-Atlantic .09139 1.34024
Black -.40547 -4.42557**





Mountain Region -.11210 -1.10410
Pacific Region .20650 2.34161**
New England .15544 1.54408
Non-High School Graduate .22025 1.37215
Some College Education .04209 .44189
College Education .46544 1.51211
Junior ROTC Experience -.28498 -1.66470
General Science -.00059 -.01383
Word Knowledge -.06683 -1.61273
Math Knowledge -.05569 -1.77550
Mechanical Comp .03492 .98672
Electronic Information .06691 2.25204**
Paygrade -.33730 -6.33655**
Moral Waiver .06729 1.41245
Other Waiver .01879 .13769
Admin Support MOS -1.08292 -10.17488**
Intelligence MOS -.63249 -3.47776**
Logistics MOS -.92023 -7.26003**
Combat Support MOS -.84727 -8.30350**
Elec. Eguip. Repair MOS -.63031 -6.83301**
Communications MOS -.66409 -5.83100**
Aircraft Repair Ord. MOS -.87553 -9.24390**
Supply MOS -.87446 -6.60564**
Mechanic MOS -.83633 -6.69488**
Aircraft Operations MOS -.79923 -6.70523**
Months in Delayed Entry -.02068 -2.68826**
Summer Enlistee -.45991 -8.42331**
Number of Promotions .27035 3.14387**
INTERCEPT INTERCEPT/SE
PEARSON GOODNESS OF FIT CHI SQU7
9.37623 22.22476
^RE=4394.026 DF= 4443 P=.697
*SIGNIFICANT AT 10 PERCENT.
**SIGNIFICANT AT 5 PERCENT.
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regional variables of Pacific and New England result in pos-
itive effects on quits, but only the Pacific region variable
was significant at the 5 percent level.
The education variables were not significant in this
model. Note, however, that the estimate with the largest
positive parameter estimate was those with college degrees,
while the non-grads, and those with some college had a far
smaller impact on quits. This result further supports the
thesis that to obtain a high enough return on human capital
to effect the quit decision a degree is needed.
Finally, this group's behavior with respect to speci-
fic MOSs is consistent with the general population. The
variables are negative and significant at the 5 percent
level. Those in the administrtive support have the highest
negative effect on quits, and those in electronic equipment
repair the smallest negative effect.
This model correctly predicted 95.5 percent of all
those in mental category II who quit.
3. AFQT Group III (Table 10)
This model's estimates of personal characteristic var-
iables coincide with those of the general model. Marital
status and race have significant negative effects on quits.
The regional variables for the Pacific and New England are
again positive but not significant.
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TABLE 10
PROBIT ESTIMATES OF PARAMETERS FOR AFQT GROUP III
REGRESSION COEFFICIENT
N = 6,541 COEFFICIENT /S.E.
Marital Status -.42563 -8.17731**
Number of Dependents -.01132 -.36817
Age at End of Contract -.02053 -1.56926
Mid-Atlantic -.03716 -.65357
Black -.55645 -11.05342**





Mountain Region -.08441 -.91249
Pacific Region .00917 .12022
New England .06080 .72531
Non-High School Graduate .16385 1.54018
Some College Education -.01169 -.09605
College Education .67503 1.66251
Junior ROTC Experience -.03299 -.26238
General Science .05276 1.61645
Word Knowledge -.10097 -2.92783**
Math Knowledge -.06862 -2.93298**
Mechanical Comp .01018 .38239
Electronic Information .00224 .09517
Paygrade -.47213 -10.45212**
Moral Waiver .09395 2.37859**
Other Waiver -.02725 -.29379
Admin Support MOS -1.02316 -10.26586**
Intelligence MOS -.84614 -3.24606**
Logistics MOS -.90229 -7.70808**
Combat Support MOS -.74822 -9.04625**
Elec. Equip. Repair MOS -.48143 -5.85526**
Communications MOS -.77187 8.40595**
Aircraft Repair Ord . MOS -.83991 -9.79907**
Supply MOS -.80321 -8.15142**
Mechanic MOS -.85076 -9.65585**
Aircraft Operations MOS -.92900 -6.87496**
Months in Delayed Entry -.00281 -.46965
Summer Enlistee -.45451 -9.81386**
Number of Promotions .17278 1.99046**
INTERCEPT INTERCEPT/SE
PEARSON GOODNESS OF FIT CHI SQUl
9.93189 27.79637
^RE=6677.658 DF= 6502 P=.063
*SIGNIFICANT AT 10 PERCENT.
**SIGNIFICANT AT 5 PERCENT.
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The education variable of some college was the only
one which indicated a negative effect on guits. However,
this factor is near zero and not significant. As antici-
pated not having a high-school degree had a positive effect
on guits, and having a college degree had a large positive
effect on guits. These results all support previous litera-
ture (Buddin, Ref. 11 and Blandin, Ref. 12) which indicate
that those with high school degrees are the "best bet" given
the Marines 1 goal to maintain guality people.
The variables for paygrade and job specific MOSs were
all negative and significant at the 5 percent level. The
administrative support and electrical eguipment repair MOSs
once again had the largest and smallest negative effects on
guitting. The promotion variable was positive and signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level. The overall effect of promo-
tion on this group was about half that of the general
population model.
This model correctly predicted 80.1 percent of all
those in mental category III who guit.
4. AFQT Group IV and V (Table 11)
Those in mental category IV and V generally reguire a
waiver to enter the Marine Corps. In this sub-sample there
was no one with a college degree or in the intelligence MOS
field. This group is the least recruited and guotas exist
as to how many are allowed to enlist. As a matter of policy
the Marine Corps needs to evaluate whether this group
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TABLE :LI
PROBIT ESTIMATES OF PARAMETERS FOR AFQT GROUPS IV AND V
REGRESSION COEFFICIENT
(N = 884) COEFFICIENT /S.E.
Marital Status -.41898 -2.70159**
Number of Dependents -.01186 -.13660
Age at End of Contract -.03416 -.73723
Mid-Atlantic .26163 1.39530
Black -.70381 -5.48893**





Mountain Region -.35042 -1.34420
Pacific Region -.11549 -.44606
New England .47481 1.40245
Non-High School Graduate .53551 .89445
Some College Education 3.40301 .30500
College Education .00000 .00000
Junior ROTC Experience -.14840 -.61254
General Science -.09833 -.90434
Word Knowledge .05724 .58057
Math Knowledge -.15170 -2.13070**
Mechanical Comp .08141 .90518
Electronic Information .00484 .07079
Paygrade -.72607 -5.51556**
Moral Waiver .11776 1.02772
Other Waiver -.06136 -.23565
Admin Support MOS -.76105 -2.33640**
Intelligence MOS .00000 .00000
Logistics MOS -1.28429 -3.59134**
Combat Support MOS -.76790 -3.12578**
Elec. Eguip. Repair MOS -.85356 -3.42093**
Communications MOS -.69007 -2.76745**
Aircraft Repair Ord . MOS -.65765 -2.67339**
Supply MOS -.59662 -2.03134**
Mechanic MOS -.92211 -3.64181**
Aircraft Operations MOS -.70650 -1.90936*
Months in Delayed Entry -.07844 -3.94772**
Summer Enlistee -.18432 -1.14624
Number of Promotions .60931 2.38360**
INTERCEPT INTERCEPT/SE
PEARSON GOODNESS OF FIT CHI SQUl
11.66455 9.67575
^RE=1684.642 DE'= 847 P=4E-32
SIGNIFICANT AT 10 PERCENT.
**SIGNIFICANT AT 5 PERCENT.
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provides a sufficient substitute in quality and quantity to
meet future manpower needs given the recent decline in the
available population.
The model results show that with regards to personal
characteristics this group behaves similarly to the general
population. Differences occur in the education factor which
have large positive effects on quits, as opposed to the high
school graduate estimates. This model indicates that while
in the short run those from this category (IV and V) may
quickly fill recruiting quotas, their higher propensity to
quit will lead to manpower shortfalls in the future.
Finally, with respect to job specific MOSs the "signs"
and overall effect for this group were inconsistent with
previous models. This result is most probably due to crowd-
ing of the lower mental category personnel into non-
technical specialities. It is interesting to note that in
this model the promotion variable had the largest positive
effect on quits. This is difficult to explain since those
with the most promotions would, in my opinion, have better
and more rewarding alternatives available to them in the
Marines. More research is necessary to determine what fac-
tors affect the promotions of categories IV s and V's, data
which was not available for this thesis.
This model correctly predicted 94.7 percent of those
in categories IV and V who quit.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The most significant effects throughout the models were
seen in the personal and job-specific characteristics.
Being married had a significant and negative effect on quits
in all models. It appears that this result is a function of
the higher cost of quitting incurred by married Marines, who
receive greater allowances for housing, an implicit larger
benefit for family health care, and greater freedom in
determining the mix of goods they desire to purchase with
their housing and subsistance allowances. The next signifi-
cant personal characteristic, being black, resulted in
significant negative effects on quitting. This factor re-
mained unchanged in "sign" and varied little regardless of
education, marital status, education or AFQT group. This
indicates that blacks, specifically, receive a higher
utility from the compensation and benefits, both pecuniary
and non-pecuniary received in the Marine Corps versus the
civilian labor market. The results reflects the attitude of
at least perceived discrimination in the civilian labor
market, and provides evidence for the Marine Corps recovery
from the racial strife which existed in the late 70's.
The job-specific characteristics were also stable and
significant as indicators of quits in all models. The
omitted factor was infantry, and in all other MOS * s the
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overall effect on quits was negative and significant.
Specifically, in the occupations considered more desirable,
such as administrative support, logistics, and general
mechanics there were large and significant negative effect
on quits. As a result, these fields are typically over-
crowded. The more technical jobs with good transferrability
of skills to the civilian labor market had the smallest
negative effect on quits. The electronic equipment repair
and communications MOSs were smallest and as a result these
fields suffer from manpower shortages.
In attempting to model education and ability on the pro-
bability of a quit resulted in findings supported by previ-
ous literature. That is, that high school graduates, from
AFQT Groups II and III were the "best bet" for continuing to
serve in the Marine Corps past their initial enlistment.
Additionally, the variables for math knowledge and word
knowledge from the ASVAB were significant, and had a very
small negative effect on quits.
The charateristics modeling census region were disap-
pointing. In most models only one or possibly two variables
became significant at the 10 percent level. However, a con-
sistency throughout the models existed for those from the
Pacific and New England regions in that there was a positive
effect on quits. A future study would want to approach
these regional factors along with data on the economic
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environment to try to establish if certain regions tend to
produce a Marine who will be more likely to quit.
If future study could be carried on from this point it
is recommended that two approaches be taken. First, the
analyst should attempt to obtain information on perceptual
factors of Marine Corps life such as in the 1985 Department
of Defense Survey of Military Personnel. By matching these
files to the individuals' records, one may be better able to
establish inferences between perceptions and actual
behavior. Second, a more detailed analysis of quit behavior
within specific occupational fields might be done to reduce
any conflict that may arise because of the MOS grouping
technique used in this thesis.
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